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Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A 
European Perspective 
Jan Wouters∗ & Leen Chanet∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Corporations, especially multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), have become ever 
larger and more powerful since the 1970s,1 often surpassing the economic power and 
influence of states.  Thanks to the development of modern communication technologies 
and the freer movement of goods and services through trade, corporations have also 
become more mobile and are now able to move capital and business to wherever 
conditions are most favorable.  Because of high production and labor costs in 
industrialized countries, global competition, and the constant need to explore new 
markets, many corporations are now driven to developing countries.   
¶2 Corporations often bring significant benefits to the states where they operate; by 
generating tax revenues, creating jobs, transferring skills and technologies and generally 
raising the standards of living, they often make a positive contribution to the development 
of a country.2  However, they may also cause human rights problems.  Developing 
countries are often clamoring for foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and will compete to 
attract corporations by offering them attractive investment terms.  Thus, they may be 
tempted to lower working and environmental standards in hopes of attracting MNEs in 
search of ever-lower production costs.3  Developing countries may also lack the adequate 
means and resources to enforce existing standards.4  Some MNEs or their suppliers may 
take advantage of the resulting lack of enforceable regulations, leading to poor working 
conditions, restrictions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, and possibly 
child labor.  Moreover, in some cases, local governments commit human rights abuses 
with the explicit or tacit support of corporations.  This situation raises two questions: 
First, how can human rights violations by corporations be avoided and redressed?  
Second, how can corporations’ positive contributions to the countries where they operate 
be increased? 
                                                 
∗ Professor of International Law and the Law of International Organizations, Director of the Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies and Institute for International Law, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
∗∗ Research collaborator, Institute for International Law and Junior Member, Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
1 Philip Alston, The ‘Not-A-cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate 
Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 17 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
2 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, in 43 
COLUM. J.TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 397 (2004-2005); Menno T. Kamminga, Holding Multinational 
Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A Challenge for the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 553, 554 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford University Press 1999). 
3 Murphy, supra note 2, at 389-99. 
4 Id. 
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¶3 The current state of international law regarding the position of MNEs is strikingly 
unbalanced.  International law still focuses too much on protecting the rights of 
corporations (especially through international rules on trade and the protection of FDI) 
and lags far behind in regulating their responsibilities.  It is telling, for instance, that the 
statutes of the relevant international criminal tribunals remain silent on the question of 
criminal responsibility of corporate entities for their involvement in international crimes 
like war crimes and crimes against humanity.  International human rights instruments are 
also notoriously silent about such responsibilities.  In Europe today, the European 
Convention on Human Rights is seen more as an instrument that provides rights for 
corporations rather than one that lays down obligations for them, unless they are vested 
with state powers and/or are controlled by the state.5   
¶4 In the absence of hard law, there has been a marked tendency to use soft norms 
when addressing corporate human rights responsibility.  Soft norms, like those embodied 
in the United Nations (“UN”) Global Compact to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines on Multinational Corporations, the 
International Labour Organization’s (“ILO’s”) Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and corporate codes of conduct, 
are all deliberately kept legally non-binding.  Follow-up mechanisms, if they exist, are 
aimed at dialogue rather than confrontation.  
¶5 Against this backdrop, the European Union (“EU”) has an important role to play in 
ensuring that its corporations respect and protect human rights wherever they operate.  
Since human rights are core principles of the EU,6 it has a special responsibility to ensure 
that they are protected.  The EU has addressed the issue of corporate human rights 
responsibilities as part of its corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) policy developed in 
the last decade.  The purpose of this article is to assess the effectiveness of Europe’s CSR 
policy with regard to human rights.  
¶6 This article is divided into four parts.  In Part II of this article, we will search for 
the most appropriate framework capable of ensuring that corporations effectively take up 
the duty to uphold human rights and live up to that duty.  We start from the assumption 
that corporations do indeed have the duty to behave responsibly towards a variety of 
stakeholders.  In an attempt to move beyond the traditional divide between voluntary and 
regulatory approaches, we will argue that a mixed framework is needed.  Indeed, the 
‘business case’ for corporate responsibility -- that the profit-motive will encourage 
socially responsible business -- is not in itself able to guarantee responsible corporate 
behavior in all circumstances.  Mere reliance on the law, however, will not suffice either.  
Therefore, public authorities should create a framework which maximizes the benefits of 
social responsibility for corporations.  At the same time, however, regulatory measures 
must be provided to address the worst cases of human rights violations.  In Part III we 
will use the framework set out in Part II to evaluate the EU’s CSR policy and practice.  
We will first discuss the EU’s CSR policy and discuss whether it follows the mixed 
approach we have advocated in Part II.  Thereafter, we will assess to what extent the EU, 
and its Member States, have developed an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR.  
                                                 
5 See generally MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF 
ECHR PROTECTION (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
6 Treaty on European Union art. 6, para. 1, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E ) 5 [hereinafter EU Treaty]. 
(“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”). 
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We will argue that the European Commission, which is the motor of the EU’s CSR 
policy, despite having high ambitions at the outset, subsequently settled for an 
unsatisfactory voluntary approach to CSR.  Finally, in Part IV, we will make 
recommendations on what steps should be taken to achieve the mixed CSR-framework 
that would best ensure corporate human rights compliance in the EU.   In practice, the EU 
and its Member States have put in place some elements of a mixed CSR-framework, but 
they leave much to be desired.  
II. IN SEARCH OF A CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK 
¶7 Milton Friedman’s vision that the one and only social responsibility of business is 
to use its resources to engage in activities designed to increase its profits7 is an archaic 
notion.  Society now expects corporations to behave responsibly with regard to a wide 
range of stakeholders, including shareholders, consumers, workers, persons living in the 
vicinity of its operations, and even the wider community and the environment.  Society’s 
expectations are reflected in academic literature which argues that there is an evolution in 
international law towards the recognition of direct responsibility of corporations for 
human rights compliance.8  The aim of this article, however, is not to delineate the 
substantive human rights obligations of corporations under current or future international 
law.  We will discuss neither their material content -- the kind of rights which 
corporations are obliged to protect and whether those are only negative or also positive 
rights -- nor the degree of involvement in the violations required for a company to be 
liable.9  Rather, we start from the assumptions that corporations have at least an ethical 
and moral duty to behave responsibly towards their stakeholders and that they may incur 
criminal or civil liability for grave human rights violations.  Taking these concerns as a 
starting point, we search for the most efficient framework for ensuring such corporate 
human rights responsibility. 
A. The Choice Between a Regulatory or Voluntary Approach 
¶8 At the heart of the current debate about corporate responsibility lies the question of 
whether a regulatory or voluntary approach is more appropriate for ensuring corporate 
human rights, social and environmental responsibilities.  NGOs and civil society, together 
with a significant number of academics are in favor of the former, while business 
typically prefers the latter.  The proponents of a regulatory approach argue that corporate 
human rights responsibilities are too important an issue to be left completely in the hands 
                                                 
7 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Sep. 13, 1970, at 122-26 (quoted in Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder 
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L. 
J. 365, 365 n.4 (2006)).  
8 See, e.g. NICOLA JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY, 
(Intersentia 2002); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 195-270 
(Oxford University Press 2006). 
9 On the debate on corporate complicity and the margins of a company’s responsibility, see, e.g., THE 
GLOBAL COMPACT, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, 
(2005), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/2.0.2.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (for use 
of the concept of “spheres of influence”); see also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND 
VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
COMPANIES 121-141 (2002) (discussing different degrees of ‘complicity’ in human rights violations). 
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of corporations.10  They feel that the immense economic power that corporations have 
acquired should be accompanied by corresponding responsibilities.11  Moreover, as 
corporations have been accorded important rights, including under investment law and 
even under human rights law,12 proponents of the regulatory approach claim that there is 
no reason why they should not bear duties as well.13 
¶9 Proponents of a voluntary approach, in contrast, argue that there is no need for 
regulatory intervention since the market itself steers corporations towards responsible 
behavior.14  According to the ‘business case’ on CSR, responsible business behavior is 
also good economic behavior, since it leads to an increase in profitability.15  Thus, 
responsible corporate behavior within a voluntary framework is argued to be a win-win 
situation for business and society, while regulatory interference would put unnecessary 
burdens on business without providing any additional benefit. 
B. A Hybrid Framework: The Need to Move Beyond a Choice Between a Voluntary or 
Regulatory Approach 
¶10 In line with other recent academic analysis, we would like to move the debate 
beyond the black-and-white argument of voluntary versus regulatory approaches.16  In 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Pall A. Davidsson, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility Within the EU, 8 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529, 552 (2002) (stating that “certain aspects of CSR are so critical to human welfare 
that they cannot be left to the discretion of the private sector”). 
11 See generally David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilties for Corporation at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 935 (2003-2004).  The authors 
take the idea that the power of transnational corporations has to be accompanied by commensurate duties 
under international human rights law as the starting point of their examination of the possibility of directly 
regulating such corporations at the international level. 
12 See generally EMBERLAND, supra note 5. 
13 See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law: The Case of Human 
Rights and Multinational Enterprises, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 431, 433, (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds., 
2007). 
14 For example, see the responses of business representatives to the Commission Green Paper-Promoting a 
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001); see also 
CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A EUROPEAN 
FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 7 (DEC. 21 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm (“These [voluntary] actions are 
motivated by a conviction that there is an inherent bottom line value in CSR as intelligent self interest for 
corporations that also brings benefits for society”); ICSCA, GREEN PAPER ON PROMOTING A EUROPEAN 
FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY -ICSCA STATEMENTS 1 (Dec. 27, 2001), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm (“Companies with this 
[responsible] corporate philosophy are generally more successful and profitable than others; they benefit 
from sustainability as a competitive advantage.”); WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: MAKING GOOD BUSINESS SENSE, 7 (Jan. 2000), 
available at http://www.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/IunSPdIKvmYH5HjbN4XC/csr2000.pdf, (“For any company, 
giving a high priority to CSR is no longer seen to represent an unproductive cost or resource burden, but, 
increasingly, as a means of enhancing reputation and credibility among stakeholders – something on which 
success or even survival may depend.  Understanding and taking account of society’s expectations is quite 
simply enlightened self-interest for business in today’s interdependent world.”). 
15 See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (Brookings Institution Press 2005) (“According to the business case for CSR, firms will 
increasingly behave more responsibly not because managers have become more public-spirited -- though 
some may have -- but because more managers now believe that being a corporate citizen is a source of 
competitive advantage.”). 
16 See generally Sorcha MacLeod, Reconciling Regulatory Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility: 
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our view, it would be misleading to see the two approaches as diametrically opposed and 
mutually exclusive for several reasons.  In practice, legislation may take on different 
roles in a continuum, from soft to hard norms.  It may create several incentives for 
corporations, including preferential public procurement; regulatory bodies with certain 
monitoring tasks; requirements for reporting on human rights issues; or civil or criminal 
remedies against non-complying corporations, among other options.  Indeed, regulation 
may be used to make a voluntary approach more efficient.17  Seeing regulatory and 
voluntary initiatives as opposing extremes overlooks the fact that corporations already 
have several legal responsibilities, for example, corporate responsibility with respect to 
health and safety norms and working conditions.18   
¶11 On the other hand, the creation of a regulatory framework does not mean that 
voluntary initiatives are not important.  Indeed, the law is only one of a range of factors 
that influence corporate behavior.19  In some cases, corporations may be expected to do 
more than the law literally requires and, at the very least, not take advantage of its 
loopholes.20  Voluntary and regulatory approaches should therefore not be seen as 
mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary.21  The question to be resolved is, then, 
what particular mixture of regulatory and voluntary elements best ensures corporate 
human rights responsibility. 
C. An Assessment of the ‘Business Case’ of CSR 
¶12 Proponents of the ‘business case’ explain that corporations are financially rewarded 
for behaving responsibly in various ways.  They argue that not only consumers, but also 
investors and even workers, attach importance to corporations’ human rights records and 
have a clear preference for responsible businesses.22  Thus, the market itself acts as an 
important and sufficient incentive for corporations to take human rights into account, 
since responsible behavior leads to higher profits.  This assumption leads them to 
conclude that a voluntary approach to corporate responsibility is sufficient.  In order to 
                                                                                                                                                 
The European Union, OECD and United Nations Compared, in 13 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 671 (2007); 
Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New 
Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, 9, (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007).  
See also JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW , 34-40 (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
17 Cf. infra Part D.  
18 See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 31. 
19 ZERK, supra note 16, at 35. 
20 Id. at 34. 
21 Davidsson, supra note 10, at 552. 
22 VOGEL, supra note 15, at 16-17.  Vogel describes the benefits corporate social responsibility is supposed 
to bring for business as: “A more responsibly managed firm will face fewer business risks than its less 
virtuous competitors: it will be more likely to avoid consumer boycotts, be better able to obtain capital at a 
lower cost, and be in a better position to attract and retain committed employees and loyal customers.  
Correspondingly, firms that are unable or unwilling to recognize this new competitive reality will find 
themselves disadvantaged in the marketplace: both “responsible” and “sophisticated” investors will regard 
their shares as too risky; the value of their brands and thus their sales will decline as a result of media 
exposure, public protests, and boycotts; and the morale of their employees will suffer.” Id.  He then 
assesses the existence of a business case for corporate social responsibility and the actual demand of 
stakeholders for responsible corporate behavior. Id. chs 2,3.  The structure of our own discussion of the 
merits of the business case (no. 9 and following) draws upon this.  See also McBarnet, supra note 16, at 17-
19. 
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determine whether the ‘business case’ is a useful, sufficient and/or necessary approach to 
ensuring corporate human rights responsibility, we will critically examine the available 
evidence on these assumptions.  Before doing so, however, we would like to put the 
‘business case’ into the right perspective. 
1. The ‘Business Case’ as a Means for Ensuring Responsible Corporate Behavior 
¶13  When discussing the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility, it is important to 
see things from the right angle.  As explained above, we start from the assumption that 
corporations have human rights, social and environmental responsibilities with respect to 
a wide range of stakeholders.  Thus our goal is to ensure that businesses live up to these 
responsibilities.  The question then arises as to what would be the best means to reach 
that goal; in other words what kind of framework would be the most efficient in ensuring 
that corporations take up their human rights obligations.  If proven correct, the ‘business 
case’ for corporate responsibility could lead to the conclusion that the best means for 
ensuring responsible behavior are regulatory instruments which make the ‘business case’ 
work, or alternatively, the ‘business case’ could be shown to work without any regulatory 
intervention whatsoever.  Thus the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility may 
inform us as to the means needed for ensuring responsibility.  The idea that good 
responsible behavior leads to increased profits may be a good incentive for corporations 
to act responsibly, but it should never be seen as the ultimate reason for responsible 
behavior.23  Corporations have to behave responsibly because it is their duty to do so, not 
because it helps them to make more profits.24  Indeed, if respect for human rights is 
fundamental to our society, whether or not ensuring such respect would bring economic 
advantages is irrelevant; achieving it remains our final goal.  Therefore, if corporate 
social responsibility were not economically profitable, as proponents of the ‘business 
case’ for corporate responsibility claim, we would have to look for other means to reach 
our goal, not simply drop the goal because of the inherent conflict.  It is important to keep 
this perspective in mind when reflecting on the EU’s approach to corporate 
responsibilities, where it is sometimes hard to distinguish goals from means.  
2. The Impact of Socially Conscious Consumerism on Corporate Behavior 
¶14 With this perspective in mind, we will now assess the merits of the ‘business 
case.’25  First, proponents of the ‘business case’ base their argument on the premise that 
consumers take corporations’ human rights records into consideration.  A company with 
a positive human rights image would therefore be rewarded by consumers, and 
conversely, a company known to violate human rights would suffer from consumer 
avoidance and possibly even boycotts.26  Indeed, research has shown that consumers 
claim to take a corporation’s human rights record into account and that consumers are 
willing to pay more for ethically produced goods.27  A 1997 survey found that seventy-
                                                 
23 See Doreen McBarnet, supra note 16, at 24-25. 
24 See Davidsson, supra note 10, at 532. 
25 See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 46-74.  The structure of our assessment of stakeholders’ demand for 
responsible behavior is based on Vogel’s model.  It also provided the basis for our substantive analysis. 
26 See id. at 47-56 (assessing the influence of consumers on corporate behavior). 
27 See, e.g., id. at 47. 
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one percent of French consumers would choose a ‘child-labor-free’ product even if it 
were more expensive than the alternatives.28  Other surveys show that more than 30% of 
UK customers claimed to have boycotted stores because of ethical concerns and that 60% 
said to be prepared to participate in a boycott in the future.29  
¶15 There is a discrepancy, however, between what consumers say and what they 
actually do.30  In practice, only a small minority of consumers take social considerations 
into account when shopping.31  It is true that the segment of consumers who base 
decisions on corporate responsibility is growing, evidenced by the fact that consumer 
awareness in the UK of the Fair Trade Brand doubled to 50% between 2003 and 2005, 
and sales of all Fair Trade Products increased by 51% between 2003 and 2004.32  
Nonetheless, the impact of socially conscious consumerism on business profits still 
appears to be limited.  
¶16 The question then arises how the impact of socially conscious consumerism can be 
increased.  One reason consumers might not take human rights considerations into 
account when shopping may be that they lack adequate information about the responsible 
or irresponsible behavior of corporations.33  Most products do not contain any 
information about the conditions of their production, and if products do have a certain 
label, consumers may not know its exact meaning and may not trust its credibility.  They 
might be aware of the human rights behavior of large corporations -- and then mostly in 
cases of recent scandal -- but they will hardly ever be aware of the human rights record of 
lesser known brands.34  This general lack of information makes it hard for consumers to 
compare different products and leaves them unable to make informed choices.  To do so, 
they would need easily accessible, comprehensible, and credible information about the 
human rights records of corporations.  There is thus a role for public authorities to create 
a general regulatory framework to make the ‘business case’ for corporate human 
responsibility work.  Governments could require credible human rights reporting with 
effective monitoring.  They could also support or even create a credible social label and 
                                                 
28 S. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, CONFERENCE 
BOARD, RESEARCH REPORT 1234-99-RR, 9 (quoted in VOGEL, supra note 15, at 47). 
29 See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 48. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (“[S]tudies suggest that the true number of socially conscious consumers may even be lower [than 10 
percent].”) Vogel refers to a 2004 European survey (MICHEL CAPRON AND FRANÇOISE QUAIREL-
LANOIZELEE, MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS DE L’ENTREPRISE RESPONSIBLE 57 (La Decouverte 2004)), which found 
that while seventy-five percent of consumers indicated that they were ready to modify their purchasing 
decisions because of social or environmental criteria, only three percent had actually done so.  Other studies 
in Britain have reported that approximately five percent of the public strictly follows ethical concerns in 
their purchasing, while “ethical boycotts” affect less than two percent of market transactions. Dara 
O’Rourke, Opportunities and Obstacles for Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries, 
WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 22 (March 2004).  See also VOGEL, supra note 15, 
at 51-52 (discussing the limited effects of consumer boycotts). 
32 Between 2002 and 2005 there has been a 265% rise in Fairtrade products.  A 2006 Survey by the Co-
operative Bank in November 2006 put the UK ethical consumption market at £29 billion, an 11.4 per cent 
rise on the previous year compared to a 1.4 per cent rise in household expenditure more generally.  See 
McBarnet, supra note 16, at vii. 
33 See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 52. Vogel also suggests their lack of knowledge arises from lack of interest 
rather than lack of available information. Id.  We do not agree and believe that consumers still have no easy 
access to the necessary information, so that a conclusion on their interest in the matter cannot be so easily 
reached. 
34 See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 26. 
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adopt advertising laws to combat false or misleading social statements in advertising.  
Only then would consumers be able to make informed choices, taking human rights into 
account.35   
3. The Impact of Socially Responsible Investment on Corporate Behavior 
¶17 Investors are seen as a second category of stakeholders who influence the behavior 
of corporations.36  The idea is that socially responsible investors take corporations’ 
human rights policies into account when deciding in which company to invest.37  Socially 
responsible investment (“SRI”) is thus arguably an effective market incentive for 
respecting human rights, since it may be assumed that non-responsible corporations will 
find it harder to attract investors and might even see their share prices drop.  Investors 
may have two reasons for investing their money in a responsible way, both of which 
point towards a confirmation of the ‘business case’ for responsibility.  First, some 
investors may decide only to invest in ‘responsible’ corporations because they feel it is 
their moral duty to do so.  They do not want to lend their support to corporate human 
rights violations through their investment decisions.  For others, SRI may simply be a 
means of ensuring greater share returns.  Indeed, under the ‘business case’ reasoning, 
socially responsible corporations would be more profitable and SRI would make perfect 
economic sense.38  However, empirical research has not been able to prove unequivocally 
that SRI leads to higher profits.  At best,39 the risk-adjusted returns of a carefully 
constructed, socially-screened portfolio are neither better nor worse than if no social 
criteria are included in stock selection.40  This means that there is a place in the market 
for both responsible businesses and SRI, but an increase in responsible business behavior 
or SRI is not self-evident.  In practice, a socially responsible stock index was introduced 
in the UK in 2001 -- the FTSE4Good Index -- which uses criteria based on CSR.  
Although SRI is growing,41 it still only accounts for a very small part of the European 
                                                 
35 See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European 
Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 226, 227 (P. Alston ed., 2005). See also BEUC, 
EUROPEAN CONSUMERS’ ORGANISATION,  CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: BEUC COMMENTS ON THE 
GREEN PAPER, 2-3 (Feb. 6, 2002), http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/092-
NGOEU_BEUC_EU_020207_en.pdf (stating its view that it is a governmental duty to create a situation 
where consumers have an informed choice to buy sustainable and ethical products for a competitive price). 
36 Vogel, supra note 15, at 60-72. 
37 Id. at 16-17. 
38 Id. at 21-23.  Vogel also suggests that the second group of investors, compared to the first group, is 
becoming increasingly important, compared to the first group.  Id. 
39 Since their inception, two major ethical stock indexes, the FTSE4Good Index and the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index have underperformed the market by 3% and 8% respectively.  Id. at 35-36. 
40 Id. at 37.  See also Kevin Campbell & Douglas Vick, Disclosure Law and the Market for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY supra note 13 at 277 ( “Previous 
empirical studies of the comparative performance of ‘ethical’ and ‘non-ethical’ corporations did not 
provide clear evidence that CSR improved a company’s value in the stock market, but they did not clearly 
indicate that CSR activities hurt performance, either”).  Their own empirical study leads to similar 
equivocal results, which are, however, not encouraging in the sense that socially responsible corporations 
performed worse than other corporations during bad market times. 
41 See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 18 (“SRI investment in France rose 76 per cent in 2004, with 60 per cent 
of that accounted for by institutional investors.” (quoting Ethical Corporation, Business Briefs, ETHICAL 
CORPORATION, Sept. 2005, at 4). 
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stock market,42 meaning that it is unable to affect share values.43  Nevertheless, in some 
cases SRI may have some influence on corporate policies through shareholder activism.44  
¶18 All in all, the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility based on investor 
preferences seems to be weak as the market share of SRI is still very low.  It could be 
improved by putting an enabling framework into place that provides investors with easily 
accessible and credible information on corporations’ human rights policies.  The actual 
influence of SRI on corporate policies, however, could remain weak; to have a significant 
effect on shareholder value, the uptake of SRI must dramatically increase.45  Admittedly, 
shareholder activism may have some influence, but it seems insufficient to have a real 
influence in most cases. 
4. The Impact of Workers on Corporate Behavior 
¶19 A third category of stakeholders who could make corporations act in a more 
responsible way are workers.46  The idea is that the brightest and best people will not 
want to work for a company with a bad human rights record.  However, this idea falls 
short.  On one hand, research has shown that ninety-two percent of UK employees 
considered it important that their employers be socially responsible and sixty percent said 
they felt strongly about it.47  Some firms are indeed more attractive to some employees 
because of their social reputation.48  On the other hand, it has not been proven that the 
labor market provides incentives for all corporations to behave responsibly and there is 
no evidence that firms without strong reputations for social responsibility find it difficult 
to attract first-rate, highly committed employees.  In the end, having a strong reputation 
for responsible corporate behavior is only one of the many ways of making a firm a 
desirable place to work.49  Nevertheless, employees may sometimes pressure a company 
to behave more responsibly.50 
5. The ‘Business Case’ Does Not Suffice  
¶20 Having reviewed the empirical evidence, it does not seem self-evident that 
responsible behavior is indeed good for business or conversely that irresponsible 
behavior is bad for profits.  Behaving responsibly may be beneficial for some 
corporations in some situations whose marketing strategy is built entirely on their social 
reputation.51  Similarly, irresponsible behavior may be costly for well-known brands, 
since they may be easily targeted by media campaigns.52  However, it has not been 
                                                 
42 Approximately 0.36%.  See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 61. 
43 Id. at 62-63. 
44 Id. at 64-65.  See also McBarnet, supra note 16, at 37-38 (stating that NGOs, for instance, have bought 
shares in order to be able to exercise shareholder rights at annual general meetings.) 
45 See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 62-64 (according to one model SRI should occupy at least 25% of the 
market to be able to have an influence on share prices). 
46, See id. at 56-60 (providing an assessment of the influence of employees on corporate behavior). 
47 McBarnet, supra note 16, at 19. 
48 VOGEL, supra note 15, at 58. 
49 Id. at 58-59. 
50 See id. at 59-60. 
51 Id. at 50-51. 
52 Id. at 29-33. 
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proven that corporate responsibility will generally make a company more profitable.  
Thus, “the market for virtue is not sufficiently important to make it in the interest of all 
firms to behave more responsibly”53 and an appropriate regulatory framework is needed. 
D. A Hybrid Framework is Necessary to Make the ‘Business Case’ Work and Address Its 
Failures 
¶21 An important factor in the failure of the ‘business case’ for corporate human rights 
responsibility is the absence of an appropriate framework to make it work.  In order to 
improve the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility, public authorities should put 
such an enabling framework in place.  In quite the same way that market efficiencies can 
only be assured if public authorities ensure fair competition, it may very well be that 
responsible corporate behavior will only be rewarded if the right framework is in place.  
As already mentioned, a first role for public authorities is to ensure that consumers, 
investors and workers alike have access to clear and credible information on the behavior 
of corporations so that they are able to make informed decisions.  Thus, reporting on non-
financial issues according to certain guidelines could be made mandatory, verification of 
social claims should be ensured, and monitoring of code of conducts must be put in 
place.54  In addition, misleading advertising laws should be adopted to combat false social 
claims.  Apart from that, public authorities can also influence the behavior of 
corporations through their role as economic actors, especially through public 
procurement decisions.  Ironically, business representatives who favor the ‘business case’ 
are opposed to the implementation of such a framework designed to make the ‘business 
case’ work, which raises doubts about their true belief in such a ‘business case’.  Indeed, 
“[i]f voluntary adherence to CSR standards is ‘good for business,’ what do business 
entities have to fear from legally-binding obligations to respect human rights and 
environmental standards?”55 
¶22 Even with an appropriate enabling framework in place, however, not all 
corporations would gain from behaving responsibly.  If the choice is left to business, with 
shareholder value as the only justification for responsible -- or irresponsible -- behavior, 
it cannot be assumed that responsible behavior will always win out in a conflict of 
demands.  In some cases the immediate gains from violating human rights or exploiting 
weak laws in developing countries may be larger than their potential costs.  Admittedly, 
the more responsible option may be beneficial for the long-term reputational interests of a 
company, but even then corporations may prefer short-term profits and/or taking 
advantage of limited business opportunities.56  
                                                 
53 Id. at 17, 29-34. 
54 See, e.g., Davidsson, supra note 10, at 552-553.  Note that a variety of regulatory techniques may be used 
to achieve these objectives.  While it is crucial that public authorities make sure all necessary mechanisms 
are put in place, they do not necessarily need to provide all of them themselves and may delegate some to 
the private sector. 
55 Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 541, 551 (2005). 
56 See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 35, at 227 (“With respect to many socially responsible practices, 
companies will frequently find themselves in the familiar situation where what would be profitable in the 
long run if other competitors act similarly will be costly in the short run, where certain competitors seeking 
an immediate return on the investment of the shareholders, will act otherwise.”).  See also McBarnet, supra 
note 16, at 25; THE PLATFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS: SOCIAL PLATFORM RESPONSE TO THE 
COMMISSION’S GREEN PAPER, II.1 (Nov. 26 2001) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS], available at 
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¶23 This leads us to the conclusion that the ‘business case’ for corporate human rights 
responsibility is a useful, but not sufficient, means for attaining our goal of ensuring 
responsible corporate activity.  Accordingly, corporate human rights responsibility cannot 
be left to the market alone.57  Effective state action is necessary to ensure that grave 
human rights violations by business are not tolerated, whether they happen in the 
corporation’s home or host state.  Such violations must be redressed and victims must 
receive reparations.  There is thus a need for civil and criminal procedures to address 
serious violations of human rights.  
¶24 The fact that legally enforceable remedies are needed does not mean that voluntary 
initiatives lack value.  If we want corporations to truly behave responsibly, it is important 
that they not only comply with the letter, but also with the spirit, of the law.58  As Mary 
Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has aptly pointed out: 
“Regulation is crucial to minimize abuses and to enforce compliance with minimum 
norms but it alone will not establish the ‘business case’ for making the necessary 
changes.  To do so we must provide incentives, so that doing the right thing also makes 
good business sense.”59  
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CSR POLICY: AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO CORPORATE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS?  
¶25 In the previous part, we argued that a hybrid framework is needed to ensure 
responsible corporate behavior.  Such a framework will have to consist of enabling 
elements which help to make the ‘business case’ work as well as an effective sanctions 
mechanism to address failures of the ‘business case’ that may still occur in spite of the 
preventive framework.  
¶26 In this part we will assess to what extent the EU’s CSR policy intends to establish 
such a hybrid framework for CSR.  We will discuss the European Commission’s Green 
Paper on CSR of 2001 which is the real starting point of the EU’s CSR policy (section 
A), its follow-up Communication of 2002 which launched the EU Multi-Stakeholder 
Forum (section B) and the activities and outcome of the Forum (section C).  The Forum’s 
conclusions, together with the review of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, which emphasized 
the importance of growth and jobs (section D) have shaped the Commission’s current --  
purely voluntary -- approach to CSR (section E).  Its approach can be contrasted with the 
one of the European Parliament, which is in favor of a mixed approach to CSR, which in 
our view would be more desirable (section F).  In spite of the European Commission’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/092-NGOEU_Platform-of-European-Social-
NGOs_EU_011126_en.htm, (“all actors need to acknowledge that short-term profit and social 
responsibility are not always reconcilable”); Davidsson, supra note 10, at 532 (“Additional costs are 
involved in adopting new policies and schemes to align existing company practices with social 
responsibilities, and these additional costs will not always result in increased profits.  Even where 
consumers or investors reward ethical conduct, practices that are socially harmful could be even more 
profitable.”).  
57 See, e.g. Davidsson, supra note 10, 552 (“Certain aspects of CSR are so critical to human welfare that 
they cannot be left to the discretion of the private sector.”). 
58 See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 47-54 (on the need to comply with the spirit of the law and the problem 
of ‘creative compliance’). 
59 MacLeod, supra note 55, at 551 (quoting Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, RSA World Leaders Lecture: Beyond Good Intentions: Corporate Citizenship For a New 
Century (May 2002)). 
Vol. 6:2] Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet 
273 
early ambitions to put a basic enabling regulatory framework into place, and consistent 
calls from the European Parliament and NGOs for regulatory measures, the voice of 
business has prevailed, resulting in a purely voluntary approach to CSR (section G).  
A. The Starting Point for the EU’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy: the European 
Commission’s Green Paper on CSR of 2001 
¶27 Although there had been some earlier initiatives,60 the real starting point for the 
EU’s CSR policy was the issuing of the European Commission’s (“Commission”) Green 
Paper on the promotion of a European framework for corporate social responsibility 
(“Green Paper”) in 2001.61  Following the tradition of EU Green Papers, it aims to 
“launch a wide debate and seek views on corporate social responsibility at a national, 
European and international level.”62  The Green Paper defines CSR as “a concept 
whereby corporations integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis,”63 but 
makes it clear that CSR should not be seen as a substitute for regulation or legislation 
concerning social rights or environmental standards, including the development of new 
appropriate legislation.  On the specific issue of human rights, the Commission notes that 
“binding rules ensure minimum standards applicable to all, while codes of conduct and 
other voluntary initiatives can only complement these and promote higher standards for 
those who subscribe to them.”64  Although CSR itself is seen as something voluntary, the 
Commission clearly envisages an active role for public authorities:65  
[The] main contribution of a European approach [would] be to 
complement and add value to existing activities by providing an overall 
European framework, aiming at promoting quality and coherence of 
corporate social responsibility practices, through developing broad 
principles, approaches and tools, and promoting best practice and 
innovative ideas, [and by] supporting best practice approaches to cost-
effective evaluation and independent verification of corporate social 
responsibility practices, ensuring thereby their effectiveness and 
credibility.66  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the ‘business case’ for CSR lies at the base of the 
Commission’s approach.  The Commission believes that socially and environmentally 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., Commission Communication on Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations, 
COM (73) 1930 final (Nov. 7, 1973); see also MacLeod, supra note 55, at 543; Parliament Resolution on 
EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of 
Conduct of April 14,  1999, 1999 O.J. (C 104/180).   
61 Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper on CSR]. 
62 Id. at 7. 
63 Id. at 8. See also Commisson Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving 
Social Governance in the Context of Globalization, COM (2001) 416 final (July 18, 2001) (confirming the 
Commission’s view that CSR initiatives are of a voluntary nature). 
64 Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, at 15. 
65 Olivier De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 2 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 203, 
207 (2008). 
66 Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, at 7. 
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positive behavior “can result in better performance and can generate more profits and 
growth,”67 acknowledging, however, the “need for better knowledge and further studies 
on the impact of corporate social responsibility on business performance.”68  All in all, 
the underlying rationale of the Commission seems to be that there is a ‘business case’ for 
CSR, but that public authorities should create the necessary framework conditions to 
make this ‘business case’ work.  
¶28 In the Commission’s vision, responsible corporate behavior should be promoted by 
enabling consumers and investors alike to take a corporation’s human rights, social and 
environmental record into account.  It sees an important role for the EU in establishing 
the necessary means for providing consumers and investors with reliable information to 
allow them to make informed decisions.  More concretely, the Commission addresses the 
importance of social responsibility reporting, the monitoring and verification of CSR 
practices,69 and suggests the creation of a public social label.70  As regards SRI, it points 
out the need for further standardization, harmonization and transparency in screening 
tools and metrics used by screening agencies.71  In addition, public authorities would have 
a direct role to play by “support[ing] education and awareness-raising around labor 
conditions issues, promot[ing] best practice through sponsorship of company awards, 
facilitat[ing] . . . the development of multi-stakeholder partnerships, develop[ing] . . . 
standards in social labeling, and us[ing] . . . public procurement and fiscal incentives in 
promoting labeled products”.72   
¶29 The Green Paper succeeded in its aim to launch a wide debate and received a large 
number of reactions from different stakeholders and public authorities.73  On some issues, 
especially the role of public authorities in providing a regulatory framework for CSR, 
different stakeholders have taken diametrically opposed views.  NGOs emphasize that a 
purely voluntary approach to CSR would be insufficient and that voluntary commitments 
should not be seen as a substitute to regulation or legislation.74  Instead, they propose a 
                                                 
67 Id. at 8 (“The economic impact of corporate social responsibility can be broken down into direct and 
indirect effects.  Positive direct results may, for example, derive from a better working environment, which 
leads to a more committed and productive workforce or from efficient use of natural resources.  In addition, 
indirect effects result from the growing attention of consumers and investors, which will increase their 
opportunities on the markets.  Inversely, there can sometimes be a negative impact on a company's 
reputation due to criticism of business practices.  This can affect the core assets of a company, such as its 
brands and image”).  See also id. at 9 (“Financial institutions are making increasing use of social and 
environmental checklists to evaluate the risks of loans to, and investments in companies.  Similarly, being 
recognized as a socially responsible enterprise, for example, through listing in an ethical stock market 
index, can support the rating of a company and therefore entails concrete financial advantages”). 
68 Id. at 9. 
69 Id. at 18-19. 
70 Id. at 21. 
71 Id. at 22. 
72 Id. at 21. 
73 All responses to the consultation on the Commission Green Paper on CSR are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm. 
74 See, e.g., E-mail from Dr. Allen White, Director, Global Reporting Initiative, in response to the call by 
the European Commission for input to the discussion opened by the recent Green Paper on Promoting a 
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 61; CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, 
REACTION FROM THE CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER 
“PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” (Dec. 21, 2001) 
[hereinafter CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN] http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/01-12-21.htm; EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL NGOS, supra note 56, paras. I.15, 1.16; OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S 
GREEN PAPER: PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
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mixture of voluntary and regulatory instruments.75  Business and employers’ 
organizations agree with the Commission’s definition that CSR involves actions that go 
beyond regulatory compliance.76  They clearly favor a voluntary approach to CSR, which 
they see as a more efficient way to promote good corporate practices than prescriptive 
governmental codes and regulations.77  Emphasizing the inappropriateness of “a one-size-
fits-all” approach,78 they stress the need for flexibility79 which could best be addressed by 
voluntary initiatives.80  Moreover, they claim, regulatory initiatives would also be 
unnecessary because of the high standards of existing regulations.81  According to some 
organizations, the only role for public authorities is to encourage voluntary corporate 
initiatives and to promote best corporate practices.82  CSR Europe,83 however, sees scope 
for regulation on specific matters of widespread social concern such as health and safety 
or exploitative employment.84  It also supports CSR-enabling legislation, citing the 
examples of disclosure regulations in the UK, France and Germany.85  
                                                                                                                                                 
SUBMISSION BY OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, para 16 (Jan. 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/091-NGOINT_OXFAM_INT_020121_en.pdf, 
[hereinafter OXFAM INTERNATIONAL]; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, EU CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
GREEN PAPER: SUBMISSION BY TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, 2 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/091-NGOINT_Traidcraft_INT_011221_en.pdf, 
[hereinafter TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE]; but see Letter from Chris Wille, Director, Rainforest Alliance, to the 
European Commission (Dec. 28, 2001) (stating that “CSR and certification are voluntary systems and 
should be market driven, otherwise they will not succeed in the long term”). 
75 See, e.g., OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, supra note 74, para. 19; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, supra note 74; 
CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, supra note 74. 
76 CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A 
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 7 (Dec. 21 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043-
COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf, [hereinafter CSR EUROPE]; see also id. at para. 15 ("It 
is illogical to speak of regulating CSR activities, if they are simultaneously to be encouraged as activities 
that lie beyond regulation”). 
77 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE GROUP ON BUSINESS IN SOCIETY, ICC COMMENTS ON THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITy” (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043-
COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf; see also ASSOCIATION DES INDUSTRIES DE MARQUE, 
AIM® POSITION PAPER: AIM REPLY TO THE GREEN PAPER ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
(Jan. 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043-
COMPNETEU_AIM_EU_020118_en.pdf; CSR Europe, supra note 76, para. 22. 
78 ICSCA, GREEN PAPER ON PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: ICSCA STATEMENTS (Dec. 27, 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/031-ORGINT_ICSCA_INT_011227_en.pdf. 
79 CSR EUROPE, supra note 76, paras. 3, 4. 
80 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN 





83 CSR Europe is a business driven network made up of over fifty member companies and linking fifteen 
national and international partner orgs around Europe, who together represent over 1200 businesses. 
84 CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A 
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 16, (Dec. 21 2001), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043-
COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf.   
85 Id. at para. 17. 
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B. The Commission’s Communication on CSR as a Business Contribution to Sustainable 
Development and Launch of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR in 2002 
¶30 After the consultation process, the Commission adopted a new Communication on 
CSR as a business contribution to sustainable development in July 2002.86   The basic 
policy views of the Commission do not seem to have changed since its Green Paper.  It 
confirms its definition of CSR and, while it expresses its belief in the ‘business case’ for 
CSR, it continues to see a role for a European CSR framework to make the ‘business 
case’ work.87  More concretely, it sees room for EU action aimed at improving 
transparency and thus credibility of CSR practices.88  
¶31 Indeed, there has been an increase in guidelines, principles and codes relating to 
CSR, which cannot be easily compared,89 which causes confusion for business, 
consumers, investors, other stakeholders and the public.”90  Therefore, “there is a need for 
a certain convergence of concepts, instruments, practices, which would increase 
transparency without stifling innovation, and would offer benefits to all parties.”91  
Further, greater consensus is necessary “on the type of information to be disclosed, the 
reporting format, the indicators used and the reliability of the evaluation and audit 
procedure [as that] would allow for a more meaningful benchmarking and 
communication of corporations' performance within particular sectors and for businesses 
of similar size.” The guidelines developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) are 
a good example which could serve as the foundation of such consensus.92  Apart from 
convergence, it is also important that codes be effectively implemented, monitored and 
verified,93 that social and environmental claims be made and assessed in accordance with 
commonly agreed-upon criteria, and that such claims be monitored by Member States 
and stakeholders.94  There is also room for an EU approach to SRI.95  
¶32 In order to make progress on all these issues, the Commission launches in this 
Communication an EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (“Forum”) on CSR whose purpose is to 
facilitate dialogue between business and their stakeholders.  The aim of this Forum is: 
to promote transparency and convergence of CSR practices and 
instruments, through (1) exchange of experience and good practice 
between actors at EU level, (2) bringing together existing initiatives within 
the EU, and seeking to establish common EU approach and guiding 
principles, including as a basis for dialogue in international fora and with 
                                                 
86 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: a Business Contribution to 
Sustainable Development, COM (2002), 347 final, (July 2, 2002). 
87 Id. at 5. 
88 Id. at 8. 
89 Id. at 12-13 
90 Id. at 8. 
91 Id. at 12-13 (references omitted). 
92 Id. at 14. 
93 Id. at 13.  
94 Id. at 15. 
95 Id. at 16. 
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third countries and (3) identifying and exploring areas where additional 
action is needed at European level.96  
The Commission invites the Forum to address and develop guiding principles on the 
issues discussed above: the effectiveness and credibility of codes of conduct, the problem 
of CSR measurement, reporting and assurance, labeling schemes based on the core ILO 
conventions and environmental standards, and the disclosure of SRI policies on pension 
and retail funds.97  In theory, it would have been possible for the Commission to develop 
these guidelines itself.  The reason for entrusting this task to the Forum was that the 
Commission absolutely wanted “ownership” of the CSR principles by all stakeholders. 
C. Activities and Outcome of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR 
¶33 The outcome of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR was unfortunately far 
less ambitious than it could have been.  From the very start, business representatives 
dominated the debate in the Forum, succeeding immediately in downgrading its mandate 
when it was formally established at its first High-Level Meeting on October 16, 2002.98  
According to its self-adopted mandate, the Forum was  
to promote innovation, transparency and convergence of CSR practices 
and instruments through improving knowledge about the relationship 
between CSR and sustainable development . . . by facilitating the 
exchange of experience and good practices and bringing together existing 
CSR instruments and initiatives, with a special emphasis on SME specific 
aspects [and by] exploring the appropriateness of establishing common 
guiding principles for CSR practices and instruments, taking into account 
existing EU initiatives and legislation and internationally agreed 
instruments such as OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises, 
Council of Europe Social Charter, ILO core labor conventions and the 
International Bill of Human Rights.99  
The mandate of the platform had one crucial difference from that envisaged by the 
Commission in its Communication: it lacked the objective of “identifying and exploring 
areas where additional action is needed at the European level.”100  This determined the 
outcome of the Forum as no proposals for legislative actions could have been proposed 
by a platform that did not have a mandate to do so.101  
                                                 
96 Id. at 17.  
97 Id. at 18. 
98 For an interesting and revealing discussion of the establishment and early life of the Forum, see Olivier 
De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 14 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL NO. 2, 203, 
210-214 (2008). 
99 EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, OBJECTIVES, COMPOSITION AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 
(Oct. 16, 2002), para. 1, available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/CSR%20Forum%20Rules.ht
m. 
100 De Schutter, supra note 98, at 213. 
101 Id. at 213-214. 
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¶34 The Multi-Stakeholder Forum presented its Final Report with results and 
recommendations at its last High-Level Meeting in June 2004.102  According to its 
foreword, the Final Report is a “fair record of points of consensus identified during the 
twenty month process and work of the Forum, [which] was presented, discussed and 
agreed [subject to internal consultation led by some NGOs with their constituencies]”.  It 
recognizes, though, that “some differences and debates . . . remain.”103  In reality, no 
consensus was reached.104  Indeed, the Final Report of the Forum represents the business 
approach to CSR, presenting it as “the voluntary integration of environmental and social 
considerations into business operations, over and above legal requirements and 
contractual obligations.  CSR is about going beyond these, not replacing or avoiding 
them.”105  
¶35 Not surprisingly, the recommendations made by the Final Report are very weak.  
The Final Report recommends that “public authorities ensure that there is both a legal 
framework and the right economic and social conditions in place to allow corporations 
which wish to go further through CSR to benefit from this in the market place, both in the 
EU and globally,”106 but does not explain what such a framework should look like.  On 
the issue of reporting and monitoring, for instance, it merely “notes that for trade unions 
and NGOs, transparent CSR reporting is a particularly important process in providing 
meaningful information, a clear record of CSR development and assessing credibility.”107  
Since business representatives have always opposed the adoption of mandatory reporting 
rules, no consensus was reached.  The recommendation on the establishment of an 
enabling framework for CSR thus rings hollow.  Only on the issue of public procurement 
is the outcome somewhat more positive, with the request for “EU and/or Member States 
[to] consider and evaluate how to use public funds in the most responsible and effective 
manner, taking into account environmental and social, as well as economic 
considerations.”108  In sum, few of the European Commission’s and Parliament’s early 
ambitions remain, and no progress has been achieved in the establishment of a regulatory 
framework, which would have enabled the ‘business case’ for CSR. 
D. The Lisbon Strategy and its 2005 Review 
¶36 In order to understand the further evolution of the EU’s policy on CSR, it is 
important to keep in mind that its CSR policy has been made a part of the “Lisbon 
                                                 




104 De Schutter, supra note 98, at 214. 
105 EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, supra note 102, at 2-3.  Richard Howitt, member of the 
European Parliament and Rapporteur on CSR has confirmed that no definition has been reached on the 
definition of CSR.  At the Review Meeting of the Forum in 2006, he said that “despite the fact that it has 
been said many times today that there is a consensus on the definition of CSR and that this is a consensus 
of the forum, really there isn’t.  We mustn’t deceive ourselves about that.  There is a European Commission 
definition of CSR that is in its communication, which we respect, but we should also respect that there are 
other views out here about the appropriateness of that definition.  To say that there is a consensus where 
there isn’t, I think it unhelpful.”  Id. 
106 Id. at 15. 
107 Id. at 15. 
108 Id. at 16. 
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Strategy”.  The European Council’s Lisbon Declaration of March 2000109 sets the goal for 
the EU to become, by 2010, “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion”.110  To help the EU achieve this rather bold objective, the 
European Council suggests a fully decentralized approach in which both corporations and 
civil partners would be actively involved.111  This suggestion has been interpreted by the 
European Commission as “a special appeal [from the European Council] to corporations’ 
sense of social responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, work 
organization, equal opportunities and sustainable development.”  The Commission sees 
its CSR-policy as a means of contributing to the Lisbon goals.112  
¶37 Given the integration of the EU’s CSR policy into the Lisbon Strategy, a review of 
the latter clearly would have an impact on the former.  Such refocusing took place in 
2005 when, following recommendations from a High-Level report prepared by Wim 
Kok113 and a concurring Communication from Commission President Barroso and Vice-
President Verheugen,114 the Council re-launched the Lisbon Strategy with a focus on 
growth and employment.115  Delivering stronger, lasting growth and creating more and 
better jobs is now seen as the key to meet Europe’s wider economic, social and 
environmental ambitions.116  Indeed, the revised Lisbon Strategy aims to “[embed] the 
European commitment to social cohesion and the environment in the heart of the growth 
process—to be a means of growth rather than a claim on it.”117  
¶38 In reality, the result of the refocusing of the Lisbon Strategy is that its goal of social 
cohesion -- and thus also the CSR debate -- has been made subordinate to the 
achievement of economic growth and more and better jobs.118  This not only seems to 
make a special CSR-aimed policy less relevant, but may also imply that CSR is only a 
policy objective insofar as it does not contradict the superior aims of growth and jobs.  
                                                 
109 Lisbon European Council, of Mar. 23 and 24, 2000, Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm. 
110 Id. para. 5. 
111 Id. para. 8. 
112 Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 6 (stating that the European Union is concerned 
with corporate social responsibility as it can be a positive contribution to the strategic goal decided in 
Lisbon). 
113 High Level Group, Facing the Challenge, The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment (Nov. 2004) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf, [hereinafter The Lisbon Strategy]. 
114 Communication from President Barroso and Vice-President Verheugen to the Spring European Council 
– Working Together for Growth and Jobs: a New Start for the Lisbon Strategy, at 24, COM (2005) (Feb. 2, 
2005). 
115 Lisbon European Council, Mar. 23 and 24, 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para. 6, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm. 
116 Communication from President Barroso and Vice-President Verheugen to the Spring European Council 
– Working Together for Growth and Jobs: a New Start for the Lisbon Strategy, at 7, COM (2005) (Feb. 2, 
2005). 
117 The Lisbon Strategy, supra note 113, at 39.  In that sense aiming for growth and jobs is believed to go 
hand in hand with promoting environmental and social objectives. See id. at 4, 12. 
118 Interestingly, the European Parliament does not seem to accept the new focus for the Lisbon Strategy.  
In its Resolution on a European Social Model for the future of September 2006, it indicates its 
disagreement with the European Council and the Commission, “call[ing] on the Commission and the 
Council to respect the initial equilateral triangle of the Lisbon strategy and to develop an approach that is 
better balanced between economic coordination on the one hand and employment and social policy on the 
other.” European Parliament Resolution on a European Social Model for the Future, 2006/340 final (Sept. 
6, 2006), para. 11. 
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This is problematic, since corporate responsibility should be a goal in itself; the fact that 
it may bring economic benefits may act as an incentive for policymakers, but should not 
be their motivation for ensuring compliance by corporations.  Just as corporations should 
not act responsibly merely because it will increase their profits, public authorities should 
not promote responsible corporate behavior on the grounds of its economic benefits.  
Respect for human rights has to be considered a priority and should not risk being 
sacrificed for economic growth.  Sadly, however, CSR no longer seems to be a priority 
for the EU.119   
E. The Commission’s Current Approach to CSR 
¶39 Following the final report of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR and the review 
of the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission issued its latest Communication on CSR, entitled 
“Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making Europe a pole of excellence 
on CSR.”120  The name of the document is telling: in accordance with the refocusing of 
the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission sees CSR as merely a means to create growth and 
jobs rather than an end in itself.  Abandoning the view that CSR needs an enabling public 
framework in order to be profitable for corporations, the Commission now opts for a 
completely voluntary approach, believing that “an approach involving additional 
obligations and administrative requirements for business risks being counter-productive 
and would be contrary to the principles of better regulation.”121  It “acknowledg[es] that 
enterprises are the primary actors in CSR, [and] has decided that it can best achieve its 
objectives by working more closely with European business.”122  With this, the 
Commission leaves behind both its mixed approach to CSR and the idea that multi-
stakeholder involvement is essential to the promotion and development of CSR.  Instead, 
it chooses to favor the most powerful of stakeholders, namely business.  
¶40 On the important issue of ensuring transparency and credibility of CSR practices, 
for instance, the Commission admits that consumers still lack clear information on the 
social and environmental performance of goods and services, including information on 
the supply-chain, but sees only room for voluntary actions as a remedy.123  The 
Commission thus does not conclude that the voluntary approach taken by the Forum did 
not succeed in making progress on the matter and that time has come for some regulatory 
intervention.  Indeed, the only role the Commission sees for itself with respect to CSR is 
to raise awareness in order to promote best practices124 and to support multi-stakeholder 
initiatives.125  The Forum itself is to be regularly reconvened, but merely with a view to 
continually reviewing progress on CSR in Europe.126  
¶41 Moreover, the only follow-up to the Forum is a European Alliance on CSR, a 
purely voluntary alliance of European enterprises, set up by the Communication.  The 
                                                 
119 See De Schutter, supra note 98, at 206. 
120 Commission Communication Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a 
Pole of Excellence on CSR, COM (2006) 136 final (Mar. 22, 2006). 
121 Id. at 2. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 7. 
124 Id. at 6. 
125 Id. at 7. 
126 Id. at 3. 
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Alliance will function as an umbrella for new or existing CSR policies.  It is not a legal 
instrument, but a purely political process to increase European corporations’ compliance 
with CSR.127  The fact that there are no formal requirements for declaring support for the 
Alliance, and that the European Commission will not keep a list of corporations that 
support it, stresses its purely voluntary character.128  Contrary to the Multi-Stakeholder 
Forum, which started with a rather broad mandate and included a variety of 
stakeholders,129 the only ambition of the Alliance is to bring business together.  It has 
been launched as a joint initiative of the Commission and part of the business world 
without even consulting other stakeholders.130  Business representatives are thereby 
favored above other stakeholders and the furtherance of CSR has been entirely entrusted 
to business itself.131 
F. The Contrasting View of the European Parliament  
¶42 It is interesting to contrast the evolution of the Commission’s CSR policy with the 
view of the European Parliament.  The Parliament has always been in favor of a mixed 
approach to corporate human rights responsibility, combining voluntary and regulatory 
mechanisms.132  It accepts that the starting point to CSR is a voluntary approach,133 and 
that voluntary initiatives promoting the ‘business case’ for CSR should be preferred to 
legislation as a more effective and efficient way of achieving measurable outcomes.134  
Nevertheless, it considers that regulation, where appropriate, is an option.135  To start 
with, the Parliament would like public authorities to create an enabling framework for 
CSR.  It emphasizes the importance of providing consumers and investors with credible 
information on CSR practices and has asked for mandatory reporting on social and 
environmental issues,136 independent verification of reports,137 the creation of a European 
Monitoring Platform138 and a proposal on social labeling.139  It has also called for the use 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 6. 
129 See supra Part III.B.   
130 According to the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Alliance on CSR is “of the 
nature of a joint initiative on the part of the Commission and part of the business world, and . . . the other 
interested parties were not consulted.” Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a 
Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, para. 1.10, COM (2006) 136 final (Dec. 30, 2006). 
131 See De Schutter, supra note 98, at 216 (noting that this perceived preference for business was a 
particularly damaging political message). 
132 Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: 
Towards a European Code of Conduct of 14 April 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 180, Preamble, Recital F 
[hereinafter Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises]. 
133 Parliament Resolution 2002/278 on the Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility (COM(2001) 366 – C5-0161/2002 – 2002/2069(COS)) of 30 May 
2002, 2003 O.J. (C 187 E), Preamble, Recital J [hereinafter Parliament Resolution on the Commission 
Green Paper]. 
134 Id. para. 2. 
135 Id. Preamble, Recital J. 
136 Id. para. 6. 
137 Id. para. 8. 
138 Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, para. 14. 
139 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 11. 
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of advertising laws to combat false and misleading social and human rights claims.140  In 
order to create incentives for corporations to behave more responsibly, it has suggested 
taking corporations’ social and human rights behavior into account in public procurement 
decisions.141  Finally, should this preventive, enabling framework fail, the Parliament 
recognizes the need for remedial measures, and has suggested the possibility of initiating 
civil liability proceedings against corporations domiciled in the EU under European 
conflict of laws rules.142  The framework envisaged by the European Parliament thus 
reflects our idea of an optimal corporate human rights responsibility framework, set out 
above. 
¶43 Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament does not approve of the current CSR 
policy of the Commission and the way business has succeeded in dominating the Multi-
Stakeholder Forum.  This is shown by the Parliament’s March 13, 2007 Resolution on 
corporate social responsibility: a new partnership143 adopted in response to the 
Commission’s Communication.  The resolution starts by stating that CSR must be linked 
to the principle of corporate accountability144 and “notes the concerns expressed by some 
key stakeholders about the lack of transparency and balance of the consultation procedure 
undertaken before adoption.”145  While it recognizes the Commission’s definition of CSR, 
it makes it clear that stakeholders have not reached a consensus on an appropriate 
definition for CSR.146  Importantly, it expresses its disappointment stemming from the 
lack of progress that has been made since the Green Paper, believing that the time has 
come to shift emphasis from “processes” to “outcomes.”147  Indeed, while the 
Commission has been busy creating “political processes” -- first the Forum and then the 
Alliance -- not much has been achieved on the various elements of the Parliament’s 
proposed framework on CSR.  Apparently seeing no better option to further the debate, it 
suggests to expand the role of the Alliance as envisaged by the Commission, adding to its 
aims the identification and promotion of specific EU action and regulation to support 
CSR.148 
G. An Evaluation of the EU’s CSR Policy 
¶44 The evolution of the EU’s CSR policy has thus, to this point, been rather 
disappointing.  The European Parliament has consistently supported a mixed approach to 
CSR and has proposed an interesting framework which closely resembles the theoretical 
framework we set out in the first part of this article.  However, it has done so from the 
sidelines.  Although the European Commission also seemed to have rather great 
ambitions in the early development of its CSR policy, it has completely dropped these 
                                                 
140 Id. para. 33.  See also id. Preamble, Recital 12. 
141 Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, para. 28. 
142 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 54.  For a discussion of 
the possibility to initiate civil liability proceedings against companies based in the EU for damage abroad, 
see infra Pt. IV.B.1. 
143 European Parliament resolution on corporate social responsibility: a new partnership of 13 March 2007 
(2006/2133(INI)). 
144 Id. para. 1. 
145 Id. para. 2. 
146 Id. paras. 3-4. 
147 Id. para. 7. 
148 Id. para. 13. 
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under the influence of business and the review of the Lisbon Strategy.  Unfortunately, it 
now favors a completely voluntary approach to CSR that does not suffice to ensure 
corporate compliance with human rights responsibilities.  
IV. DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN HYBRID FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESPONSIBILITY  
¶45 We have now evaluated the EU’s CSR policy, as it has been developed by the 
European Commission.  This part of the article will take a step back and focus on the 
actual development of a European hybrid framework for corporate human rights 
responsibility, rather than on the EU’s policy.  Indeed, although the Commission has 
completely abandoned the idea of a mixed approach to CSR, there have been some 
initiatives, by the EU and a number of Member States, to develop certain regulatory 
elements of a CSR framework.  We will evaluate these initiatives against the ideal 
framework as it has been set out in Part II and assess to what extent an appropriate 
framework has already been developed, by the EU and/or Member States, and which 
elements are still lacking or need improvement. 
¶46 First, we will address the elements of an enabling framework for CSR, aimed at 
making the ‘business case’ for CSR work.  Afterwards we will assess whether an 
appropriate sanctions mechanism has been set in place, in case the preventive framework 
fails. 
A. Creating an Enabling Framework for CSR 
¶47 In order to make the ‘business case’ for CSR work, public authorities have to 
establish an appropriate framework.  First, they have to ensure that stakeholders have 
easy access to credible information on corporate human rights behavior, so that they are 
able to make informed choices.  The measures taken by the EU to ensure such access to 
credible information will be evaluated in the first subsection of this part.  Second, they 
should use their own economic power to influence corporate human rights behavior, 
particularly through considering human rights in public procurement decisions.  The 
possibilities EU law offers for doing so will be discussed in the second subsection of this 
part.   
1. Improve Transparency and Ensure Credibility of Corporations’ Social and Human 
Rights Claims  
¶48 Improving the access through credible information on corporate human rights 
behavior has been recognized by the European Parliament as an important task for public 
authorities in creating an enabling framework designed to make the ‘business case’ work.  
This is demonstrated by the fact that the Parliament has consistently argued in favor of 
more mandatory reporting, independent verification of reports and monitoring 
compliance with codes of conduct.149  It has also suggested the use of misleading 
advertising regulations to combat unfaithful claims.150  
                                                 
149 See, e.g., Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, at para. 14; 
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, paras. 6, 8, 11. 
150 Parliament Resolution  on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 33.  See also id. 
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¶49 Early on in the development of its CSR policy, the Commission also saw a role for 
public authorities in improving the transparency and credibility of corporations’ human 
rights claims.  It stressed the need for more convergence of CSR instruments and pushed 
for more monitoring of CSR commitments, even suggesting that a social label be 
created.151  However, as discussed above, the EU Multi-stakeholder Forum failed to 
achieve consensus on the issue,152 and the Commission later dropped the idea of 
regulatory intervention, considering it counterproductive and bad for innovation.153  
¶50 Nevertheless, the EU has taken some measures to ensure that stakeholders have 
access to credible information on corporate human rights behavior through reporting and 
through the use of laws on misleading advertising laws. 
i) Measures to ensure transparency and credibility through reporting 
 
¶51 The 2003 Accounts Modernization Directive, which amends earlier directives on 
the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of corporations, banks and other 
financial institutions and insurance undertakings,154  imposes an obligation on 
corporations to take non-financial matters into account in the preparation of their annual 
reports.  It requires all annual reports to “include at least a fair review of the development 
and performance of the company’s business and of its position, together with a 
description of the principal risks and uncertainties it faces.”155  The Directive points out 
explicitly that “to the extent necessary for an understanding of [these elements], the 
analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating 
to environmental and employee matters.”156  When transposing the Directive into national 
law, Member States may waive the obligation to provide this non-financial information 
for small corporations.157 
¶52 Thus, while the Directive does not impose an absolute obligation to provide non-
financial information in all annual accounts, it does require corporations to include 
information on environmental and employee matters insofar as it is necessary for a good 
understanding of the company’s business development, performance or position.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Preamble, Recital 12. 
151 Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 66,. 
152 Cf. supra Part III.C. 
153 Commission Communication Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a 
Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, at 2, COM (2006) 136 final (March 22, 2006). 
154 Council Directive 2003/51 of June 18, 2003, Amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 
86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16-22 (EC) 
[hereinafter Accounts Modernization Directive]. 
155 Id. art. 1, para. 14 (amending Council Directive 78/660, art. 46(1)(a), based on Article 54(3)(g) of the 
Treaty on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222)).  For consolidated 
accounts see Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 2, para. 10(a) (replacing Directive 
83/349, art. 36(1), Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, 1983 O.J. (L 193)). 
156 Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 1, para. 14 (amending Council Directive 78/660, 
art. 46(1)(b), based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of 
Companies 1978 O.J. (L 222)).  For consolidated accounts see Accounts Modernization Directive, supra 
note 154, art. 2, para. 10(a) (replacing Directive 83/349, art. 36(1),  based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the 
Treaty on Consolidated Accounts 1983 O.J. (L 193)). 
157 Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 1, para. 14 (adding a fourth paragraph to 
Council Directive 87/660, art. 46, 1978 O.J. (L 222)). 
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However, this is only a very small step toward the mandatory disclosure of credible 
information on matters of corporate social responsibility.  Such a mandate would require 
clearer guidance on the exact information to be disclosed, explicitly including human 
rights matters.  It could build on the experience of private initiatives such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative, as has been suggested earlier by both the Commission and the 
Parliament.  Under current EU law, however, corporations only have very limited 
obligations to report on their corporate human rights compliance.158  
¶53 It is regrettable that the EU has not provided for mandatory reporting on social and 
human rights matters.159  Although an increasing number of corporations report on a 
voluntary basis, it is unrealistic to believe that soon all corporations will do so; the 
‘business case’ for voluntary reporting thus does not apply consistently to all 
corporations.160  The argument that mandatory reporting would stifle innovation and that 
it is still too soon to adopt a specific reporting standard is exaggerated.  Indeed, it seems 
perfectly possible to require corporations to respect certain guidelines for their social and 
human rights reporting, while avoiding overly detailed rules that may not be appropriate 
for all cases.  The fact that it would be more difficult and costly for small and medium 
enterprises to provide comprehensive human rights reports may influence the specific 
requirements imposed on them, but is not a reason per se to abandon the idea of 
mandatory reporting. 
ii) The use of misleading advertising laws 
 
¶54 The use of legislation on misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices is 
an interesting means of ensuring the credibility of corporations’ social claims.  While not 
obliging corporations to subscribe to any substantive rules, it offers the possibility of 
holding them responsible for making false claims.  Specifically, corporations could be 
held accountable for false claims about their adherence to certain codes of conduct or 
their respect for human rights.  
¶55 Kasky v. Nike is a well-known example of the use of misleading advertising 
regulations.  In 1998, a California resident sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices 
                                                 
158 However, some member states have gone further than EU law requires. The UK, Belgium and Germany, 
for instance, require pension fund managers to state whether and how they take social, environmental and 
ethical decisions into account in their investment decisions.  See Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.) Amendment Regulations, 1999 S.I. 1999/1849, 
reg. 11A(a) (U.K.) (amending Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations, 1996, SI 1996 
/3127 (U.K.)); Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds) (Amendment) 
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/3259 (U.K.) (amending Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and 
Investment of Funds) Regulations, 1998, S.I. 1198/1831 (U.K.)); Law concerning Supplementary Pensions 
and the Fiscal Regime of Such Pensions and of certain Supplementary Benefits Concerning Social Security, 
April, 28, 2003, art 42, §1 (F.R.G.); McBarnet, supra note 16, at 32.  France requires disclosure of social 
issues in annual reports and accounts of listed corporations.  Nouvelles Régulations Economiques, Law No. 
2001-240 of May 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
May 16, 2001, art. 116, p. 7776. Publication of a ‘bilan social’ providing employee-related information 
about inter alia health, salaries and working conditions has been required since 1977.  Decree No. 77- 1354 
of December 8, 1977, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
December 10, 1977, p. 5751. 
159 Some EU Member States, however, require reporting.  See, e.g., HALINA WARD, LEGAL ISSUES IN 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, PREPARED FOR THE SWEDISH PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY 3-4 
(International Institute for Environment and Development) (Feb. 2003). 
160 Id. 
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under California’s Unfair Competition Law161 and False Advertising Law,162 claiming 
Nike had made misrepresentations of its working conditions in factories overseas in 
letters to newspaper editors and university presidents.163  According to Nike, its claims 
were political speech and the lawsuit was therefore barred by the First Amendment.  In 
reversing the decisions of the California Superior Court164 and the California Court of 
Appeals,165 the California Supreme Court166 qualified Nike’s statements as commercial 
speech and allowed the case to proceed.  Nike then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which first granted certiorari, but then dismissed it as improvidently granted because of 
jurisdictional problems and sent the case back to the Californian courts for further 
proceedings.167  Nike and Kasky subsequently reached a settlement in September 2003168 
and the merits of the case were never decided.  As a result, the California Supreme 
Court’s decision that Nike’s statements were commercial speech still stands and it 
remains undetermined whether Nike’s public relations campaign actually infringed 
California’s Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws.  Critics have attacked both 
the California Supreme Court’s judgment and the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide the 
issue.  Perhaps surprisingly, part of the criticism was based on the potentially negative 
effects of the rulings on CSR.  Some critics argued that the judgments would have a 
chilling effect on CSR reporting because corporations would become less transparent 
about their CSR policies, fearing possible liability.169  Indeed, following California’s 
Supreme Court judgment, Nike announced that “it would limit its work in corporate 
accountability, not release its 2002 corporate responsibility report and restrict public 
platform activities.”170  In 2005, however, Nike published its 2004 corporate social 
responsibility report and made a return to transparency, finding that “the risks of any 
future lawsuit were far outweighed by benefits of transparency."171  Indeed, corporations 
have good business reasons for continuing to tell their side of the story, they just need to 
be more careful that what they say is accurate.  A potential chilling effect would in any 
event be avoided if reporting on social and human rights issues were mandatory.172  
                                                 
161 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (2003). 
162 Id. 
163 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3-4, Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2002 WL 
32101098. 
164 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App.  2000). 
165 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 2 P.3d. 1065, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511 (Cal. 2000). 
166 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Cal. 2002), rehearing denied (Jul 31, 2002). 
167 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657-658 (2003). 
168 Nike agreed to contribute $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which will use these funds 
to focus on three primary areas: (1) improving independent monitoring in manufacturing countries, (2) 
developing worker education and economic opportunity, and (3) advancing a common global standard to 
measure and report on corporate responsibility performance.  William Baue, The Implications of the Nike 
and Kasky Settlement on CSR Reporting, Ethical Corporation (September 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=1130.  
169 For a discussion of the potential effects of the ruling on CSR reporting see Michele Sutton, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Corporate Social Responsibility and Potentially Legal Liability Under Kasky v. 
Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1178-1182 (2004).  See also Vicky McIntyre, Note, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving 
Corporate America Speechless, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1531, 1562-1565 (2004). 
170 Sutton, supra note 169, at 1175 (quoting Baue, supra note 168).  
171 Sarah Murray, Nike makes the step to transparency, Financial Times, Apr. 13, 2005, at 12 (quoting 
Hannah Jones, Nike’s Vice-President of Corporate Responsibility). 
172 Baue, supra note 168. 
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¶56 The use of misleading advertisement laws against false social or environmental 
commercial claims is also possible under EU law.  It had been suggested by the European 
Parliament173 even before the recent revision of the European advertisement rules made 
their relevance to false social or human rights claims more explicit.  Inaccurate or 
incomplete representations by corporations about CSR or their adherence to and 
compliance with voluntary codes of conduct can be attacked on the basis of the 2005 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive174 or the 2006 Directive Concerning Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising.175  The former applies to unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices and the latter aims to protect traders.176  As business-to-consumer 
practices are the most relevant for us, we will focus on the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive.177  
¶57 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (“Directive”) generally prohibits 
misleading practices as unfair commercial practices, insofar as they (1) are contrary to the 
requirements of professional diligence and (2) materially distort or are likely to materially 
distort the average consumer’s economic behavior with regard to the product.178  The 
latter means that they have to “appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an 
informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he 
would not have taken otherwise.”179  The term ‘transactional decision’ is understood quite 
broadly by the Directive to mean “any decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, 
how and on what terms to purchase, make payment . . . for, retain or dispose of a product 
or to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides 
to act or to refrain from acting.”180  Given the fact that a large proportion of consumers 
claim to take the human rights record of corporations into account,181 it can be argued that 
false commercial statements on human rights issues will indeed materially distort -- or at 
least be likely to materially distort -- the consumer’s ability to make an informed 
decision, and thus will fall under the general prohibition of the Directive. 
¶58 According to the Directive, a commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading 
“if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way . . . deceives or 
is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in 
relation to one or more of [a certain list of] elements, and in either case causes or is likely 
                                                 
173 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 33 (“Calls on the 
Commission to enforce strong consumer protection measures to uphold the credibility of corporate 
information in relation to environmentally and socially responsible business practice, in particular applying 
provisions regarding misleading advertising;”).  See also id. Preamble, Recital 12. 
174 Parliament Directive (EC) 2005/29, Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in 
the Internal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450 (EEC), Directives 97/7 (EC), 98/27 (EC) and 
2002/65 (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 6 November 2005, sec. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 149) 22 [hereinafter 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive]. 
175 See generally Parliament and Council Directive 2006/114 (EC) Concerning Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising (codified version), of 12 December 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 21 [hereinafter 
Misleading Advertising Directive]. 
176 Id. art. 1. 
177 The provisions of the Directive had to be transposed into national law and should have entered into force 
by December 12th 2007. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, art. 19. 
178 Id. arts. 5, 6. 
179 Id. art. 2(e).  This requirement reflects the fact that the scope of the Directive is limited to practices 
related to a commercial transaction in relation to a product.  See id. at art. 3(1). 
180 Id. art. 2(k). 
181 See supra Pt. II. 
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to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise,”182 
including the “geographical or commercial origin of the product.”183  Thus, deceptive 
information about “the working conditions in which the advertised goods were produced, 
or . . .  the countries in which the production took place” would be prohibited.184 
¶59 Another prohibited practice, insofar as it misleads or is likely to mislead the 
average consumer, is the “non-compliance by a trader with commitments contained in 
codes of conduct185 by which he has undertaken to be bound, where (i) the commitment is 
not aspirational but firm and capable of being verified, and (ii) the trader indicates in a 
commercial practice that he is bound by the code.”186  The Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive thus explicitly provides a means of ensuring that corporations comply with the 
voluntary codes they have subscribed to.  Finally, it is in all circumstances prohibited for 
a trader (1) to claim to be a signatory to a code of conduct when he is not; (2) to claim 
that a code of conduct is endorsed by a public or other body when it is not; or (3) to 
display a trust mark, quality mark or equivalent without having obtained the necessary 
authorization.187  The Directive thereby ensures a minimum control of the use of code of 
conducts and labels in commercial statements.  
¶60 On the whole, the substantive provisions of the Directive are satisfying.  Subject to 
reasonable interpretation by enforcement bodies, the Directive lays down effective rules 
that clarify its use as a means to ensure the credibility of corporate social and human 
rights statements. 
¶61 As regards enforcement of the rules, the Directive gives Member States several 
options.  The bottom line is that persons or organizations which have, according to 
national law, a legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices, should be 
able to take action against such practices.  It is up to Member States, however, to decide 
on the form of such action.  They can allow them to go to court and/or to bring unfair 
commercial practices before an administrative authority, which must be competent either 
to itself decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings.188  It is “for 
each Member State to decide which of these facilities shall be available and whether to 
enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior recourse to other 
established means of dealing with such complaints, including [proceedings before bodies 
of code owners].”189 
                                                 
182 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, at art. 6(1). 
183 Id. at art. 6, para. 1(b).  Under the Misleading Advertising Directive, information provided about the 
geographical or commercial origin of a product also has to be taken into account to determine whether 
advertising is misleading. Misleading Advertising Directive, supra note 175, art. 3(a). 
184 See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 301. 
185 According to Article 2(f) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, “code of conduct” means “an 
agreement or set of rules not imposed by law, regulation or administrative provision of a Member State 
which defines the behavior of traders how undertake to be bound by the code in relation to one or more 
particular commercial practices or business sectors.”  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 
174, art. 2(f). 
186 Id. art. 6, para. 2.  The Misleading Advertising Directive in turn defines “misleading advertising” as 
“any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to 
whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect 
their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor.” 
Misleading Advertising Directive supra note 175, art. 3(a). 
187 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, art. 5. 
188 Id. art. 11, para. 1. 
189 Id. art. 10 juncto art. 11, para. 1. 
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¶62 However, the Directive’s sanctions for misleading practices are rather 
disappointing.  Member States are only obliged to allow the courts or administrative 
authorities dealing with complaints to order cessation of the unfair practice, or to institute 
appropriate legal proceedings for an order of cessation.  If the unfair commercial practice 
is imminent, courts must be able to order prohibition of the practice or institute legal 
proceedings for an order of such prohibition.  Besides that, Member States may give the 
courts or administrative authorities the power to require publication of its decision and 
the publication of a corrective statement.190  Such publication would inform consumers 
that certain advertising was misleading and may have a negative impact on the image of a 
corporation.  It therefore encourages corporations to avoid misleading advertising. 
¶63 A lot of flexibility, therefore, is left to Member States in deciding how to deal with 
complaints.  Indeed, enforcement mechanisms vary widely between Member States, 
ranging from a state-controlled regime to self-regulation.  The Nordic countries have an 
efficient state-controlled enforcement system.  They have instituted a consumer 
ombudsman who polices advertisements and responds to complaints.  This ombudsman 
can issue fines or prohibit further publication of the advertisements in question.  More 
controversial cases are sent to the market court.191  In other countries, such as the UK, 
Ireland and Belgium, enforcement is in the hands of a self-regulatory body.  The 
efficiency of such bodies differs greatly: whereas some operate quite well with a rather 
high degree of independence from the advertising industry, others are not so independent, 
do not include a wide range of stakeholders and do not even publish their decisions.192  In 
any event, in practice, proceedings often take a long time, which means that decisions are 
frequently reached after the advertising is already over.  In such cases, publication of the 
decision would be the only possible remedy.  Since several countries do not allow judges 
to order publication, however, corporations may get away with misleading advertising 
without being effectively sanctioned.193 
2. Obligate Human Rights Consideration in Public Procurement Decisions 
¶64 Taking human rights into account in public procurement is another manner of 
enabling the ‘business case’ for CSR to work.  Such measures would enable public 
authorities to use the awarding of public contracts as a means of encouraging businesses 
to comply with human rights responsibilities.  Attaching a certain weight to human rights 
considerations seems perfectly legitimate as it would represent the collective preferences 
of citizens who increasingly want to buy products from responsible corporations.194  
Since public procurement is an important sector of the European Community, with 
spending by public authorities accounting for 16.3% of the Community GDP,195 it may 
prove to be a very efficient incentive for corporations to improve their social behavior. 
                                                 
190 Id. art. 11, para. 1.  
191 See BRADFORD ROHMER, GREENWASH CONFRONTED: MISLEADING ADVERTISING REGULATION IN THE 
EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 6, 22-23 (Friends of the Earth Europe) 
http://www.foeeurope.org/corporates/pdf/greenwash_confronted.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2008). 
192 Id. at 6-7, 35-40. 
193 Id. at 6, 22-23. 
194 Surveyed consumers apparently hold this collective preference, but, for a more nuanced discussion, see 
c.f. supra Pt. II. 
195 See EU Policy on Public Procurement, http://europa.eu/publicprocurement/index_en.htm, (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2008). 
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¶65 Indeed, the potential of public procurement to increase corporate human rights 
compliance was recognized early on by the European Commission and Parliament, and 
has also been encouraged by civil society.  Already in its Green Paper, the Commission 
recognized the potential of public procurement as a means of encouraging the use of 
social labels.196  In their reactions to the Green Paper, several NGOs also stressed the role 
of public procurement as a means to encourage responsible corporate behavior.  They 
asked the Commission and other EU institutions to take social and environmental 
considerations into account for their own procurement and to ask Member States to do 
the same.197  The European Parliament has called on the Commission to raise awareness 
among public purchasers about the possibilities offered by existing Community law with 
regard to the integration of social and environmental considerations into public 
procurement.198  In 2001, the Commission had issued an interpretative Communication on 
Community law applicable to public procurement, explaining the admittedly rather 
restrictive possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement.199  
Moreover, in its follow-up Communication to the Green Paper it suggested that EU 
Member States “[make] access to public procurement conditional on adherence to and 
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, while respecting 
EC international commitments.”200 
¶66 The potential to consider human rights in public procurement decisions is based on 
the European Directives in this area -- that seek to harmonize national laws -- and 
especially the binding interpretation of these Directives by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).  Since the latest Directive on public procurement of 2004201 only partly codifies 
earlier judicial interpretations of the previous Directives,202 the case-law of the ECJ 
                                                 
196 See Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 83; see also Parliament Resolution on the 
Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 17. 
197 BEUC, EUROPEAN CONSUMERS’ ORGANISATION, supra note 35, at 1-2; CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, 
supra note 74; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, supra note 74, at 4; OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, supra note 74, paras. 
35, 40; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 3, 7, COM (2001) 366 final (March, 14, 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/012-GOVEU_Committee-of-the-
Regions_EU_020327_en.pdf; SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
INTERNATIONAL’S COMMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S GREEN PAPER: “PROMOTING A EUROPEAN 
FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” 1 (Dec. 29, 2001) 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/031-ORGINT_SAI_INT_011229_en.pdf. 
198 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 17.  The European 
Parliament had already recognized the importance of public procurement as an incentive for corporations 
complying with international standards.  Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises 
Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of Conduct of 14 April 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 
104), 180, para. 28. 
199 Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community Law Applicable to Public Procurement 
and the Possibilities for Integrating Social Considerations into Public Procurement, COM (2001) 566 
final, 2001 O.J. 27-41 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
200 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: a Business Contribution to 
Sustainable Development, at 23, COM (2002), 347 final, 23 (July 2, 2002). 
201 Council Directive 2004/18 (EC), On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Work 
Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114-240, Corrigendum 
O.J. (L 351) 44. [hereinafter Public Procurement Directive].  For the water, energy, transport and postal 
services, a separate Directive has been adopted: Council Directive 2004/17 (EC), Coordinating the 
Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors, 
2004 O.J. (L 134), 1-113, Corrigendum O.J. (L 358) 35. 
202 The Public Procurement Directive aimed to codify the previous case-law of the ECJ, as can be seen in 
the first Recital, according to which the Directive “is based on Court of Justice case-law, in particular case-
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remains important.  For reasons of clarity, we will take the current Directive as a starting 
point in explaining the role of social considerations in the award of public contracts, and 
refer to relevant case-law where needed. 
¶67 There are three stages in the awarding of a public contract to the most suitable 
bidder.  First, certain candidates may be or must be excluded from participation 
according to Articles 45 and 46 of the Directive.  Already at this stage, the social 
behavior of a candidate -- or the lack thereof -- may be taken into account.  Thus, a 
candidate who has been convicted for participation in a criminal organization, corruption, 
fraud or money laundering is excluded.203  More importantly, an economic operator may, 
inter alia, be excluded from participation if he “has been convicted by a judgment which 
has the force of res judicata in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of any 
offence concerning his professional conduct”204 or if he “has been guilty of grave 
professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can 
demonstrate.”205  According to the Preamble to the Directive, national law can determine 
that non-compliance with environmental legislation or legislation on unlawful 
agreements in public contracts are offences concerning the professional conduct of the 
economic operator concerned or grave misconduct.206  It is thus for the Member States to 
define these concepts in their national legislation and to determine whether non-
compliance with certain social obligations constitutes grave professional misconduct.  
¶68 Second, the suitability of the remaining candidates has to be checked in accordance 
with the criteria of economic and financial standing and of professional and technical 
knowledge or ability.207  According to the ECJ, no other criteria may be taken into 
account, which means that there is no room in this particular determination for social 
considerations.208  
¶69 Third, all eligible offers are ranked and the most suitable candidate is awarded the 
contract.  At this stage, social considerations have a role to play, as ECJ case-law 
demonstrates.  In Beentjes,209 the ECJ was confronted with the question of whether social 
considerations, specifically measures aimed at combating long-term unemployment, 
could be taken into account in the award of public contracts.  The Court made it clear that 
there is indeed room for social considerations to be taken into account in the actual 
awarding of the contract.  According to the Directive, a public contract has to be awarded 
either to the one offering the lowest price or to the most economically advantageous 
tender.210  In order to determine the most economically advantageous tender, public 
authorities may take various criteria into account, such as price, period for completion, 
running costs, profitability and technical merit.  As the Directive does not contain an 
exhaustive list of criteria, authorities may also use other criteria as long as they are aimed 
                                                                                                                                                 
law on award criteria.” Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, Preamble, First Recital. 
203 Id. art. 45, para. 1. 
204 Id. art. 45, para. 2(c). 
205 Id. art. 45, para. 2(d). 
206 Id. Preamble, para. 43. 
207 Id. art. 44.   
208 Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 4635, para. 17 juncto 
para. 28. Note that the use of environmental management standards may be taken into account at this stage.  
See Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, art. 48, para. 2(f). 
209 Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV, 1988 E.C.R. 4635. 
210 Id. para. 18 (referring to Article 29 of the Directive applicable at the time, which corresponds to Article 
53 of the Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201). 
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at identifying the most economically advantageous offer,211 are given sufficient 
publicity,212 and comply with all relevant provisions of Community law, such as the 
principle of non-discrimination.213  
¶70 The ECJ further elaborated its view on the potential for additional award criteria in 
Concordia Bus.214  The case concerned the awarding of a contract for the urban bus 
network of Helsinki according to the most economically advantageous offer standard, 
which was to be assessed by reference to three categories of criteria: the overall price of 
operation, the quality of the bus fleet, and the operator's quality and environment 
management.  The Court reiterated that the award criteria listed in the Directive are not 
exhaustive, which means that additional criteria may be used.215  Importantly, it pointed 
out that not all of the award criteria used by the contracting authority to identify the most 
economically advantageous tender must necessarily be of a purely economic nature, since 
factors which are not purely economic may influence the value of an offer from the point 
of view of the contracting authority.216  
¶71 As Article 6 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community demands that 
environmental protection requirements be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of Community policies and activities,217 there is clearly room for 
environmental criteria when assessing the most economically advantageous offer, as long 
as certain conditions are fulfilled.  The additional award criteria -- in this case related to 
the preservation of the environment -- must be linked to the subject-matter of the 
contract, should not give the contracting authority an unrestricted freedom of choice as 
regards the award of the contract, must be expressly mentioned in the contract documents 
or the tender notice, and must comply with all the fundamental principles of Community 
law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination.218  
¶72 The possibility of taking into account environmental considerations when awarding 
contracts according to the economically most advantageous tender was confirmed in EVN 
AG, Wienstrom GmbHi.219  This case concerned a contract for the supply of electricity, 
where the criterion that the electricity would be produced from renewable energy sources 
was given a weight of forty-five percent.220  The ECJ reiterated the conditions for award 
criteria laid down in Concordia Bus and pointed out that the contracting authorities are 
free not only to choose the criteria for awarding the contract, but also to determine their 
weight, provided that the weight enables an overall evaluation to be made of the criteria 
applied in order to identify the most economically advantageous tender.221  Given that the 
                                                 
211 Id. para. 19. 
212 Id. paras. 2, 31. 
213 Id. paras. 20, 29-30.  This has been confirmed by later case law.  See generally C-225/98, Commission 
v. France, 2000 E.C.R. I-7445 (concerning combating unemployment as an additional award criterion). 
214 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I-07213. 
215 Id. para. 54. 
216 Id. para. 55. 
217 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 6, of 29 December 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E) 37 
[hereinafter EU Treaty] (“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view 
to promoting sustainable development.”). 
218 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland, at paras. 56-64. 
219 Case C-448/01, EVN AG, Wienstrom GmbH v. Wienstrom GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I-14527. 
220 Id. paras. 15-18. 
221 Id. paras. 34, 37-39. 
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use of renewable energy contributes to the reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases 
(one of the main causes of climate change), and considering that the EU and its Member 
States have pledged to combat climate change, the Court accepted that the use of 
renewable energy be used as a criterion with a forty-five percent weight.222  Insofar as all 
relevant conditions are complied with, nothing seems to exclude the extension of this 
case-law to the use of the human rights behavior of a company as an additional award 
criterion.  The fact that the Treaty on the European Union ranks fundamental rights 
among the principles on which the Union is founded -- and which are considered to be 
common to all Member States223 -- may provide support for that argument.224  
¶73 Although the 2004 Directive was intended to include previous case-law,225 it fails to 
include a reference to social or human rights considerations as additional award criteria.  
In its non-exhaustive list of award criteria linked to the subject-matter of the public 
contract which may be taken into account when awarding the contract to the most 
economically advantageous tender, it only mentions quality, price, technical merit, 
aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, 
cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery date and delivery 
period or period of completion, and the lowest price.226  Regrettably, no criteria regarding 
the social performance of the bidder are mentioned, contrary to the draft Directive, which 
at the European Parliament’s insistence contained specific provisions relevant to work-
force matters as part of the award criteria.227  
¶74 The Directive does, however, mention social and environmental considerations as 
“special conditions relating to the performance of a contract” which may be set out by the 
authorities, provided that they are compatible with Community law and are indicated in 
the contract notice or in the specifications.228  The Preamble mentions “compl[iance] in 
substance with the provisions of the basic International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Conventions, assuming that such provisions have not been implemented in national law” 
as an example of such a contractual condition.229  In principle, it would have been 
possible to refer to other instruments of international human rights law as well, thus 
encouraging Member States to take compliance with human rights standards into account 
in awarding public contracts.230 
                                                 
222 Id. paras. 40-42.  Austria lost the case however, because (1) the criterion was not accompanied by 
requirements which permit to verify the information submitted by tenders and (2) tenders were required to 
state how much electricity they could supply from renewable energy sources to a non-defined group of 
consumers, and allocated the maximum number of points to whichever tender stated the highest amount, 
where the supply volume was taken into account only to the extent that it exceeds the volume of 
consumption expected in the context of the procurement, i.e. the criterion was not directly related to the 
subject-matter of the public procurement contract.  Id. 
223 The first paragraph of Article 6 of the EU Treaty provides: “The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member States.”  EU Treaty, supra note 217, art. 6. 
224 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 311. 
225 Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, Preamble, Recital 1. 
226 Id. art. 53, para. 1. 
227 CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: CASE LAW AND REGULATION 178 (Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
228 Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, art. 26. 
229 Id. 
230 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 312. 
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¶75 When evaluating the role of social considerations in the current European public 
procurement regime, one cannot but have mixed feelings.  On the one hand, it is very 
positive that social considerations clearly have a role to play.  Case-law from the ECJ has 
made it clear that public authorities may use social considerations as additional award 
criteria as long as certain conditions are fulfilled.  The new Public Procurement Directive 
states explicitly that, subject to certain conditions, social considerations may be posited as 
contractual performance conditions.  Moreover, national legislation may determine that 
non-compliance with certain social obligations constitutes grave professional misconduct, 
thereby making it possible to exclude non-complying candidates from participation in 
public contracts.  
¶76 On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the new Public Procurement Directive has 
not explicitly listed social considerations as an award criterion and has generally failed to 
clarify their scope in public procurement.  Such clarification would have encouraged 
Member States to pay attention to the social and human rights record of corporations 
when awarding public contracts.  In practice, the public procurement policies of Member 
States increasingly take social factors in account.231  However, more could be done and 
the European Parliament has found it necessary to point out “that major efforts should be 
undertaken by the Commission and Member State governments at national, regional and 
local level to use the opportunities provided by the revision of the public procurement 
Directives in 2004 to support CSR by promoting social and environmental criteria 
amongst potential suppliers.”232  
B. Providing for Redress and Deterrence 
¶77 Even if a perfect preventive framework were in place, the occurrence of human 
rights abuses can not entirely be ruled out.  Therefore, it is important to have an effective 
sanctions mechanism in place to redress potential human rights violations.  Such a 
mechanism needs to ensure that victims receive adequate reparation and that corporate 
wrongdoers are held to account.  It also serves to deter corporations from committing 
future violations. 
¶78 There are two principal ways of providing for redress and deterrence, namely civil 
liability proceedings and criminal proceedings.  Since each has its own advantages, an 
ideal framework should provide for both.  Currently, however, the European framework 
fails to do so. 
1. The Use of Civil Liability Proceedings 
¶79 Foreign direct liability proceedings are one means for holding corporations 
accountable and providing reparations for victims.  The European Parliament has referred 
to corporate accountability as one means of ensuring that corporations respect human 
rights233 and has addressed the issue of foreign civil liability for European corporations in 
                                                 
231 For a very short overview see EUROPA, Employment & Social Affairs, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/csr-
matrix/csr_topic_allcountries_en.cfm?field=14.  Examples of countries that take social criteria into account 
in their public procurement policies are Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
232 Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: a New Partnership, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 62) para. 39 
(2007). 
233 Id. para. 41.  
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a number of resolutions.  In 1999, it made reference to the rules regarding conflict of 
laws,234 and in its next resolution on CSR it pointed out “that the 1968 Brussels 
Convention (now Brussels I Regulation) […] enables jurisdiction within the courts of EU 
Member States for cases against corporations registered or domiciled in the EU in respect 
of damage sustained in third countries.”235  It also asked “the Commission to compile a 
study of the application of this extraterritoriality principle by courts in the Member States 
. . . [and] call[ed] on the Member States to incorporate this extraterritoriality principle in 
legislation”.236  In its latest resolution on CSR in 2007, it again explicitly pointed out the 
possibilities offered by the Brussels I Regulation for bringing EU-domiciled corporations 
before European courts expressing its belief “that CSR policies can be enhanced by better 
awareness and implementation of existing legal instruments [and] call[ing] on the 
Commission to organize and promote awareness campaigns and monitor the 
implementation of the application of foreign direct liability according to the Brussels 
Convention.”237   
¶80 Indeed, according to European conflict of laws regulations, foreign direct liability 
cases are possible in the EU.  Thanks to Council Regulation 44/2001,238 better known as 
the “Brussels I Regulation,” concerning the allocation of jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters239 in the EU,240 the courts of EU Member States are competent to 
adjudicate civil proceedings against corporations based in the EU for acts which have 
taken place outside the EU even if the damage occurred outside the EU and the victim is 
not domiciled in the EU.   
¶81 The Regulation’s primary rule for allocating jurisdiction is the domicile of the 
defendant, with Article 2 (1) stipulating that “persons domiciled in a Member State shall, 
                                                 
234 Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: 
Towards a European Code of Conduct, of 14 April 1999, Preamble, Recital 18, 1999 O.J. (C 104), 180 
(“having regard to Article 220 of the EC Treaty regarding reciprocal recognition of court judgments (31 
Treaty EU), the 1968 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, usually known as the Brussels Convention, (now Brussels I Regulation).”) Rapporteur Richard 
Howitt’s proposal for the resolution included a more explicit paragraph, in the operative part of the 
resolution, at para. 24: “requests the European Council to confirm the interpretation in the 1968 Brussels 
Convention that, for cases of basic duty of care, legal action may be taken against a company in the EU 
country where its registered office is, in respect of any third country throughout the world and calls on the 
Commission to study the possibility of enacting done by MNEs, thus creating a precedent for developing 
customary international law in the field of corporate abuse.”  Committee on Development and Cooperation, 
Report on EU standards for European Enterprises operating in developing countries: towards a European 
Code of Conduct, A4-0508/98, (Dec. 17, 1998), available at http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/howit.htm.   
235 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para 50.  
236 Id. 
237 Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 232, para. 37. See also id. para. 32 (“Calls on 
the Commission to implement a mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can seek 
redress against European companies in the national courts of the Member States[.]”). 
238 Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, of 22 December 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1-23 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I 
Regulation]. The Brussels I Regulation is the successor to the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
239 Brussels I Regulation art. 1, para. 1.   
240 Council Decision 2006/325, 2006 (L 120), 22 (EC). Although the Regulation is not directly applicable 
to Denmark, the country is bound by it through the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Kingdom of Denmark on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters of 19 October 2005, 2005 O.J. 62-70.  
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whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”241  The ECJ has 
made clear that “although the court seized must be that of a Contracting State, that 
provision does not further require that the plaintiff be domiciled in [a Member] State.”242  
This means that persons domiciled in a non-Member State, i.e. the most likely victims of 
abuses by multinationals overseas, may sue a company before the courts in the Member 
State where the company is domiciled.243  
¶82 Apart from this general rule of jurisdiction, there is also another provision which 
may be of interest to plaintiffs: if a dispute arises out of the operations of a branch, 
agency or establishment of a company domiciled in the EU, the parent company may also 
be sued in the courts of the State where that branch, agency, or establishment is 
located.244  This is so even if those acts -- e.g., the lack of supervision -- have effects 
outside the state where the branch is situated.245  The added value for plaintiffs is that if a 
parent company and its branch responsible for the actual damage are domiciled in 
different EU countries, plaintiffs can choose whether to institute proceedings in the State 
of the parent company -- on the basis of the general rule of Article 2 (1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation -- or in the State of its branch.  As civil procedures are different in all Member 
States, with class-actions for human rights violations, for instance, being exclusive to the 
UK, this extra choice of forum may in practice be very useful. 
¶83 Such use of the competence of the European courts to deal with civil cases against 
corporations on the basis of their being domiciled in the EU has been referred to as a 
“European ‘Foreign Tort’ Claims Act,”246 making reference to the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(“ATCA”) of the United States.247  Nonetheless, the mechanism provided by the Brussels 
I Regulation differs from the ATCA in several ways.248  First, as opposed to ATCA, the 
Brussels I Regulation does not require the plaintiff to be an alien.  The domicile of the 
defendant in the EU is sufficient in order to establish jurisdiction and neither the domicile 
nor the nationality of the plaintiff is relevant in this respect.249  Second, the Brussels I 
Regulation may be relied upon in all civil proceedings against corporations domiciled in 
                                                 
241 Brussels I Regulation art. 2, para. 1 (“Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State 
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”).  According to Article 60 
para. 1 of the  Brussels I Regulation, the domicile of a company or other legal person or association of 
natural or legal persons, is the place where it has its (a) statutory seat, (b) central administration, or (c) 
principal place of business.  Id. art. 60, para. 1.  If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the 
jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the 
law of that Member State.  Brussels I Regulation art. 4, para. 1. 
242 Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company 
(UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, para. 45. 
243 See id. paras. 57-61. 
244 Brussels I Regulation art. 5, para. 5.   
245 See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 265; Geret Betlem, Transnational Litigation Against Multinational 
Corporations Before Dutch Civil Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, at 286-288 (Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) (referring to the findings of the ECJ in Case C-439/93, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v. 
Société Campenon Bernard, 1995 E.C.R. I-961). 
246 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 265. 
247 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
248 See Jan Wouters, Leen De Smet & Cedric Ryngaert, Tort Claims Against Multinational Companies for 
Foreign Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad: Lessons from the Alien Tort Claims Act?, in 
GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION, 183-200 (P.J. Slot and M. Bulterman eds., 2004). 
249 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 266.  This is why he refers to the mechanism as a “Foreign” and not an 
“Alien” Tort Claims Act. 
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the EU.  ATCA, on the other hand, can only be invoked in case of an alleged violation of 
the ‘law of nations.’ The instituting of proceedings against a company domiciled in the 
EU on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation does not per se determine the law applicable 
to the conflict.250  
¶84 Finally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, often an important procedural hurdle 
to ATCA foreign direct liability cases, will not bar adjudication under the Brussels I 
Regulation.  According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may stay an 
action brought before it if an alternative forum exists to which plaintiffs may turn that 
would be more appropriate, unless substantial justice could not be done there.251  As the 
general principle that defendants may be sued in the courts of the State of their domicile 
is a mandatory rule wherefrom no derogation is permitted, courts in which a case is 
brought on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation cannot rely on the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens to decline jurisdiction.  This is so even if the competing forum would be in a 
non-Member State.  
¶85 Such a conclusion could already be implied from the ECJ judgment in the Group 
Josi Reinsurance Company SA case, which stated that the rules on jurisdiction that are 
now reflected in the Brussels I Regulation are “applicable where the defendant has its 
domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member 
country.”252  This was also the conclusion reached by commentators.253  
¶86 The ECJ has now explicitly confirmed the non-applicability of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine in the case of Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson.254  In that case, the 
Court began by confirming the applicability of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention in 
cases where the conflict involves “relationships between the courts of a single 
Contracting State and those of a non-Contracting State rather than relationships between 
the courts of a number of Contracting States”.255  Once the Court came to this conclusion, 
it addressed the question of the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
such cases.  First, it stressed the mandatory nature of Article 2 of the Brussels 
Convention, and the fact that it can only be derogated from in the cases expressly 
                                                 
250 On the question of the law applicable to tort actions for human rights violations see De Schutter, supra 
note 35, at 274-75. 
251 See, e.g. Lubbe & Ors v. Cape plc., UKHL 41, [2000], 1 WLR 1545 (applying the classic Spiliada test). 
252 Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company 
(UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, at para. 61.  The Court continues: “It would be otherwise only in exceptional 
cases where an express provision of the Convention provides that the application of the rule of jurisdiction 
which it sets out is dependent on the plaintiff's domicile being in a Contracting State,” but the jurisdictional 
rules relevant for our purposes (as referred to above) do not provide for this.  Id. 
253 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 271-272 (“The position thus expressed by the European Court of Justice 
seems to suggest that, if it had answered either the Harrods or the Lubbe courts on the interpretation of the 
1968 Brussels Convention in those cases, it would probably have found the application of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, in situations where the United Kingdom has jurisdiction based on the domicile in that 
State of the defendant, to be incompatible with the requirements of the Brussels Convention, or, today, with 
those of Regulation No. 44/2001.”).  The Court of Appeals in Re Harrods disagreed and the House of 
Lords did not need to ask for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ, since it had already decided that the 
English courts had jurisdiction.  See id. at 268-272 for more information on the cases.  See also Halina 
Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: Implications and 
Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 451, 461-462 (2000-2001) (stating that Group Josi 
Reinsurance Company SA “spells the death of the forum non conveniens principle in foreign direct liability 
cases involving dependant companies domiciled in England and Wales”). 
254 Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C. R. OJ C 106, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
255 Id. para. 35. 
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provided for by the Convention.  There is no such exception on the basis of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, although the question was discussed by the drafters of the Brussels 
Convention.256  
¶87 The ECJ next explained that application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
would prevent the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the 
Brussels Convention, from being fully guaranteed.257  This principle requires that “a 
normally well-informed defendant [be] reasonably able to foresee before which courts, 
other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued.”258  Since the 
forum non conveniens doctrine allows courts a wide discretion as regards the question 
whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum, it would undermine the 
predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention and thus undermine 
the principle of legal certainty.259  
¶88 The Court also reasoned that the application of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens would undermine the legal protection of persons established in the 
Community, since defendants are generally better placed to conduct their defense before 
the courts of their domicile and the forum non conveniens doctrine would not allow them 
to reasonably foresee before which other court he may be sued.260  Moreover, the forum 
non conveniens doctrine would also cause problems for claimants.  Indeed, when 
defendants consider an alternative foreign court more appropriate, it would be up to 
claimants to prove that they would not be able to obtain justice there.  Alternatively, 
claimants would have to prove that the foreign court in fact does not have jurisdiction to 
try the action, or that, in practice, they are unable to obtain effective justice before that 
court.261  
¶89 Finally, the forum non conveniens doctrine is only recognized by a limited number 
of States, so its application would undermine the uniform application of the jurisdictional 
rules of the Brussels Convention and therefore run counter to its objective of 
harmonization.262  
¶90 The Court then logically concluded that the Brussels Convention does not allow 
courts to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens in order to decline their 
jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant, even in cases where the competing 
forum is that of a Non-Member State.263 
¶91 The clarification by the ECJ that the issue of forum non conveniens is irrelevant if a 
defendant company has its domicile in an EU Member State is important.  Indeed, as a 
number of UK cases have shown, corporations have systematically relied on the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens as a means to stay tort proceedings by foreign claimants.  At 
minimum, the invocation of forum non conveniens results in lengthy proceedings.  One 
example is the Edward Connelly vs. RTZ Corporation case.  It dealt with a UK national 
who had contracted cancer of the throat, allegedly as a result of negligent exposure to 
uranium dust during his work in a uranium mine in Namibia.  Relying on legal aid, he 
                                                 
256 Id. para. 36. 
257 Id. para. 38. 
258 Id. para. 40. 
259 Id. para. 41. 
260 Id. para. 42. 
261 Id. para. 42. 
262 Id. para. 43. 
263 Id. para. 46.  
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brought proceedings in England against the parent company of the mining company and 
another associated company, both of which were registered in England.  After endless 
court battles about forum non conveniens, the House of Lords agreed that “the Namibian 
forum is not one in which the case can be tried more suitably for the interests of all the 
parties and for the ends of justice.”264  However, the Queen’s Bench Division 
subsequently held that the case was time-barred.265  
¶92 Another well-known case in which the issue of forum non conveniens has been 
debated at length is Lubbe & Ors v. Cape.  In this case, more than 3000 South African 
claimants sued Cape for damage they sustained due to their alleged exposure to asbestos 
resulting from the activities of a Cape subsidiary mining company in South Africa.  In 
2000, after lengthy proceedings, the House of Lords allowed the case to proceed because 
in South Africa: 
the plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional 
representation and the expert evidence which would be essential if these 
claims were to be justly decided.  This would amount to a denial of justice.  
In the special and unusual circumstances of these proceedings, lack of the 
means, in South Africa, to prosecute these claims to a conclusion provides 
a compelling ground, at the second stage of the Spiliada test, for refusing 
to stay the proceedings here.266 
¶93 A puzzling question is why, if the Brussels Regulation can be a useful tool for 
European civil damages claims against European corporations for human rights abuses 
abroad, have there not been more cases?  One of the reasons may be that procedural laws 
in Europe are less favorable than in the US.  The general principle that the loser of a case 
pays its own as well as the winner’s costs may raise the threshold for launching a case.267  
Other reasons may be the general lack of contingency fee arrangements and the 
impossibility for class actions (the UK, traditionally home to European civil liability 
cases, being a notable exception to both).  Of course, the lengthy duration of civil trials, 
problems of evidence and lack of funding also may have an influence.   
¶94 However, it may also be that it is still too soon to assess the real impact of the ECJ 
ruling in the Owusu case.  The UK has traditionally been the European country where 
most of the civil cases against (parent) corporations have been launched by foreign 
victims for damages sustained abroad.  One can only assume that now that the important 
procedural hurdle of forum non conveniens has been lifted by the ECJ, more suits against 
corporations will be launched.  A recent article in the Financial Times suggests that this is 
exactly what is happening.268  One of the claims launched in the aftermath of the Owusu 
judgment is a collective action brought by 12,500 Ivorians who say they were poisoned 
                                                 
264 Connelly v. RTZ Corporation plc & Ors. UKHL 30 [1997] C.L.C. 1357. 
265 Connelly v. RTZ Corp plc & Anor [1999] C.L.C. 533. 
266 Lubbe & Ors v. Cape plc., UKHL 41, [2000], 1 WLR 1545.  For a description on the evolution of the 
proceedings in this case see HALINA WARD, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SEARCH OF A TREATY? SOME 
INSIGHTS FROM FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY (Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 2002), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3033_corporate_accountability_insights.pdf.  
267 WARD, supra note 159, at 16. 
268 Michael Peel, European Lawyers in Hunt for Big Game, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/927bab82-cf57-11dc-854a-0000779fd2ac.html.  
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by toxic chemicals dumped by a ship chartered by Trafigura, an oil trading company, in 
2006.269  
2. The Use of Criminal Accountability 
¶95 To this point, there have not been any EU initiatives in the field of criminal 
corporate responsibility for grave human rights violations.270  Professor Olivier De 
Schutter has suggested that the EU could adopt an instrument requiring its Member States 
to criminalize serious corporate violations of human rights, regardless of whether those 
violations are committed at home or abroad by one of their nationals or habitual 
residents.  EU instruments dealing with trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of children, which provide for extraterritorial incrimination, could serve as a 
model for such an instrument.  It would also be preferable to action by individual 
Member States.  De Schutter argues convincingly that, if the right legal basis were found, 
there would be no conceptual difficulties in adopting such an instrument.271  
¶96 As for now, the only examples of criminal cases brought against corporations for 
grave human rights violations are national ones.  Human rights NGOs and victims 
associations have tried to use the more user-friendly criminal jurisdictions of Member 
States to hold multinationals accountable.  These systems are, in particular, States whose 
systems of criminal procedure are based on the civil law “partie civile” model.  In this 
model, private individuals can bring a complaint and the investigating criminal magistrate 
is required to take it up.  The “partie civile” model, in combination with national criminal 
statutes that provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for international crimes such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, has opened the door to some interesting 
proceedings.  
¶97 A well-known and disappointing example is when proceedings were launched 
against Total, a French corporation, in France and Belgium by Burmese claimants.272  The 
claimants in the French case alleged that Total made them engage in forced labor in the 
construction of a pipeline.  However, since Burmese law does not provide for jurisdiction 
over forced labor, and there is not enough available information to know whether the acts 
could have been seen as ‘sequestration,’ the proceedings were discontinued in 2006.  
Indeed, the necessary information could only have been supplied by the claimants, which 
                                                 
269 Id.  The case has been allowed to go forward as a class action and is expected to go to trial shortly.  
Leigh Day & Co, Press Release: Ivory Coast – Alleged Toxic Waste Claims, Feb. 2, 2007, 
http://www.leighday.co.uk/doc.asp?doc=1032&cat=850. 
270 Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 232, para. 31, 41.  Although it might be 
possible to read an implied reference to criminal mechanisms in the call from the European Parliament on 
the Commission “to implement a mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can seek 
redress against European corporations in the national courts of the Member States” and its belief “that the 
CSR debate must not be separated from questions of corporate accountability.” 
271 See De Schutter, supra note 35, 282-295, for a discussion of the possibility and the form of a European 
initiative inviting the Member States to adopt certain measures to ensure that certain forms of corporate 
conduct, leading to severe violations of human rights, are made punishable by criminal legislation 
applicable not only in the territory of each Member State, but also to the conduct of corporations 
established in a Member State, even when the conduct takes place outside the territory. 
272 For background information about the case and a description of the proceedings, see generally Olivier 
De Schutter, Les Affaires Total et Unocal: Complicité et Extraterritorialité dans l’Imposition aux 
Entreprises d’Obligations en Matière de Droits de ‘lHomme, 52 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, 55 (2006). 
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in the meantime had reached a settlement with Total.273  Availing themselves of the then-
existing Belgian ‘universal jurisdiction law’ for international crimes, the claimants in the 
Belgian case alleged that Total was guilty of crimes against humanity and complicity 
with the Burmese regime in crimes against humanity.  Subsequently, however, the 
‘universal jurisdiction law’ was changed, and it now provides a much more limited scope 
for jurisdiction.  After a long jurisdictional battle between the Constitutional Court and 
the Court de Cassation, the latter stopped the proceedings.274  Following injunctions by 
the Minister of Defense, supplanting the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor has twice 
taken up the case again, but judicial authorities recently decided that the judgment of the 
Court de Cassation was final and that the case could not go further.275 
3. Civil and Criminal Accountability as Complementary Parts of an Effective Sanctions 
Mechanism 
¶98 Both criminal and civil accountability are valuable tools in the effort to promote 
corporate social responsibility.  Civil liability proceedings present some advantages over 
criminal proceedings, as victims can institute proceedings without having to await action 
on their behalf and the burden of proof is generally lighter than in criminal cases.  
Moreover, the negative publicity generated by a civil liability case may be very 
worrisome for corporations and may have a positive influence on their human rights 
behavior.276  Nevertheless, sometimes criminal proceedings may be more appropriate.  In 
criminal cases, the state apparatus may help to fight against impunity of corporations and 
ease the burden of proof imposed on victims to prove corporate misconduct.277  
Moreover, victims may be better compensated when the corporation itself, rather than 
one or more of its directors, is held directly accountable.278  Criminal cases may also help 
to ensure that the same violation will not be repeated in the future, since sanctions may be 
imposed on the corporation.279  Finally, a criminal case directed against a corporation 
                                                 
273 See id. at 70-71. 
274 Id. at 68.  The Court de Cassation asked the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling in 2004 on the 
question of whether it was discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional, that the law allowed cases 
brought by Belgian nationals to proceed, but did not do the same for plaintiffs who had obtained refugee 
status at the time of launching the case.  The question was of particular relevance for the case, since one of 
the plaintiffs had indeed obtained such refugee status as the Court de Cassation recognized on May 5, 2004.  
Id.  The Constitutional Court ruled that the distinction between Belgian nationals and persons having 
obtained refugee status was indeed discriminatory on Apri13, 2005.. Id. 
275 Id.  After the judgment of the Court de Cassation the law was adapted to the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court and the Minister of Defense, supplanting the Minister of Justice, ordered the Prosecutor to start 
proceedings to have the 2005 judgment of the Court de Cassation retracted, on the grounds that it was 
based on a no-longer existing provision.  Id.  On March 28, 2007, the Court de Cassation did not accept the 
demand for retraction, arguing that retraction was only possible for the benefit of those who have been 
negatively affected by proceedings undertaken against them and not for the benefit of the partie civile.  Id.  
Upon a second injunction of the Government, the case was taken up again by the Prosecutor, but recently 
stopped by judicial authorities.  See Joan Condijts, Les Birmans déboutés: Total l’emporte, LE SOIR, Mar. 
5, 2008, http://www.lesoir.be/actualite/monde/la-justice-met-fin-aux-2008-03-05-582191.shtml.  
276 See JÄGERS, supra note 8, at 213-214 (discussing the advantages of civil cases). 
277 De Schutter, supra note 35, at 282. 
278 Id. 
279 Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: 
Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 139, 147 (M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi eds., Kluwer 
Law International 2000); De Schutter, supra note 35, at 282-283. 
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may generate a lot of attention from the media, thus publicly shaming the corporation in 
question. 
¶99 Ultimately, both civil and criminal liability could prove to be effective measures in 
promoting corporate human rights compliance.  Since they are complementary, an 
effective sanctions mechanism should allow for both.  
¶100 Unfortunately, the current EU framework regarding corporate human rights 
responsibility fails to do so.  It allows for civil liability proceedings against corporations 
domiciled in Europe, for human rights abuses committed anywhere, but does not provide 
for corporations’ criminal responsibility.  An instrument concerning corporations’ 
criminal responsibility would be necessary to ensure an effective European sanctions 
mechanism. 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
¶101 In an attempt to move the debate beyond the black-and-white divide between 
voluntary and regulatory approaches to corporate responsibility, we have searched for an 
appropriate framework for ensuring that corporations respect human rights.  Our 
conclusion is that such a framework must include enabling measures to make the 
‘business case’ for corporate responsibility work and thereby encourage responsible 
corporate behavior.  In addition to such enabling measures, redress, in the form of civil 
and criminal procedures, must be available for the worst cases of human rights abuses.  
¶102 Unfortunately, the EU has not yet chosen to take this path, instead preferring a 
purely voluntary approach in cooperation with business.  The European Commission 
started its CSR policy with higher ambitions and envisioned an enabling framework for 
CSR.  These ambitions were later abandoned, however, likely because of the dominance 
of business in the Multi-Stakeholder Forum and the Lisbon Strategy review in 2005.  
Calls from the European Parliament for a more comprehensive framework have not yet 
succeeded 
¶103 Nevertheless, some elements of a regulatory framework have been put in place.  
Some progress has been made in providing consumers, investors and workers with access 
to credible information about corporations’ social and human rights responsibility, 
although the result is far from satisfactory.  Corporations are now expected to report on 
social and environmental matters, but no guidelines have been adopted.  Also, the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive may be relied on to combat false or misleading social 
statements, but national enforcement systems vary widely and are not always efficient.  
Unfortunately, no progress at all has been made on the issues of verification and 
monitoring.  Some leeway has also been given to public authorities to take human rights 
into account in public procurement, which may provide an incentive for corporations to 
act more responsibly.  
¶104 As far as an effective sanctions mechanism is concerned, the Brussels I Regulation 
is crucial in that it provides the authority to bring foreign direct liability cases against 
corporations domiciled in the EU without permitting the application of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine.  For the time being, however, it has not often been relied on.  
Moreover, all tort liability cases initiated so far have either been dismissed or have been 
the object of a settlement between the parties.  As regards criminal proceedings, there is 
not yet an EU instrument providing for the possibility of criminal proceedings against 
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corporations for grave human rights violations.  There have been some cases in Member 
States, but none of them has resulted in a conviction.  
¶105 We cannot but therefore unfortunately conclude that the European Union’s 
approach to corporate human rights responsibility has thus far largely failed.  Although 
some progress has been made, the approach falls far short of ensuring human rights 
compliance by all corporations. 
